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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUNK
DRIVER ROADBLOCKS IN OKLAHOMA:
STA4TE v. SMITH
I. INTRODUCTION
The annual loss of life attributable to the drunken driver' has re-
cently catalyzed public support in favor of tougher drunk driving laws.2
1. The President's Commission on Drunk Driving estimates that each year 25,000 persons
are killed in motor vehicle accidents involving alcohol. Federal Legislation to Combat Drunk Driv-
ing Including National Driver Register. Hearing on S. 671, S 672, S2158 Before the Subconm, on
Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 65 (1982) (statement of Diane Steed, Deputy Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration) [hereinafter cited as Federal Legislation]. In addition, another
700,000 individuals are injured yearly. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1983, at A24, col. 1. It has also been
estimated that between 40 and 55% of drivers fatally injured have a blood alcohol concentration at
or above the legal limit of .10%. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving: Hearing to Examine What Effect
Alcohol and Drugs Have on Individuals While Driving Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and
Drug.Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1982)
(statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse). Moreover, on Friday and Saturday nights it is estimated that one out of every 10 drivers
is drunk. Federal Legislation, supra, at 66. The loss to society is not confined to human lives;
economic losses occurring as a result of drunk driver accidents have been estimated to be in excess
of $5 billion yearly. Id at 65.
The National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism reports that Oklahoma ranks sev-
enth highest in the country in terms of per capita chronic alcohol-related health problems (e.g.,
alcoholism and liver degenerating cirrhosis), and tenth highest in the country in terms of per
capita alcohol-related casualties (e.g., drunk driving deaths and alcohol-related suicides). Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 25, 1983, at 35, col. 1. In 1982, 49% of Oklahoma's 1,434 fatal accidents
involved drivers and pedestrians who had been drinking. SERVICES AND RECORDS Div.,
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OKLAHOMA TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 20 (1982).
2. The efforts of anti-drunk driving groups like Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD)
and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) have been instrumental in causing a shift in the public's
attitude toward drunk driving. Federal Lelislation, supra note 1, at 66. Over the past several
years, 39 states have enacted stricter measures against drunk drivers, while 41 states have estab-
lished task forces or commissions on drunk driving. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK
DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 2 (1983). At the federal level, Congress has established an incentive
program which allows the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to grant additional
funding for highway traffic safety to states which adopt and implement alcohol safety traffic pro-
grams. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). In order to receive this funding the state must meet four criteria:
1) the state law must suspend a first offender's license for 90 days and for at least one year for
repeat offenders, 2) the state law must establish mandatory sentences of 48 consecutive hours in
jail or 10 days of community service for those convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) more
than once in five years, 3) the state law must consider motorists with a blood alcohol concentration
of .10% or greater to be intoxicated, and 4) the state must increase enforcement of its drunk driv-
ing laws and inform the public of such enforcement. Id. § 408(e)(l) (A)-(D). Congress has also
provided for the establishment of a national driver log to assist state licensing officials in exchang-
ing driving records and preventing convicted drivers from obtaining licenses in other states. Id
§ 401. In 1984, Congress enacted additional legislation aimed at establishing a nationwide drink-
ing age of 21. The Child Passenger Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 1984 U.S. CODE
1
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In response to this surge of anti-drunk driving sentiment, some law en-
forcement agencies have supplemented traditional techniques for en-
forcing existing drunk driving laws3 with roadblocks specifically
designed to apprehend the drunk driver.4 Driving while intoxicated
(DWI) roadblocks may, however, be unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment because they subject individuals stopped at the roadblock
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 435. Under this legislation, any state maintaining a drinking age of
less than 21 in 1987 will be subject to a withholding of 5% of that state's share of federal highway
funds for that year and 10% in 1988. Id § 6(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 437 (to be
codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (2)). This legislation also provides for incentive grants-up to a
5% increase in highway safety funding will be awarded to those states which enact mandatory
minimum sentences for persons convicted of drunk driving. Id § 7(b), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 438 (to be codified at 23 U.S.C. § 408(d)).
Oklahoma's constitution prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to persons under the age
of 21. OKLA. CONST. art. 27, § 5. Furthermore, in 1983 Oklahoma changed the minimum age for
purchasing beverages "containing more than one-half of one percent ( of 1%) of alcohol mea-
sured by volume and not more than three and two-tenths (3.2%) of alcohol measured by weight"
from 18 to 21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 241 (Supp. 1984). The relevant Oklahoma statute on drunk
driving reads as follows:
It is unlawful. . . for any person to drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle within this state who: I) [hias a blood or breath alcohol concentration...
of ten-hundredths (0.10) or more at the time of a test of such person's blood or breath
administered within two (2) hours after the arrest of such person; or 2) [i]s under the
influence of alcohol; or 3) [is under the influence of any other intoxicating substance to a
degree which renders such person incapable of safely driving or operating a motor vehi-
cle; or 4) [i]s under the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating sub-
stance to a degree which renders such person incapable of safely driving or operating a
motor vehicle.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902(A)(l)-(4) (Supp. 1984). In Oklahoma, it is also a criminal offense
for any person to operate "a motor vehicle while his ability to operate such motor vehicle is
impaired by the consumption of alcohol." OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 761(A) (1981). "[Elvidence that
there was, at the time of the test, an alcohol concentration in excess of five-hundredths (0.05) but
less than ten-hundredths (0.10) is relevant evidence that the person's ability to operate a motor
vehicle was impaired by alcohol." OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 756(b) (Supp. 1984). In contrast, "evi-
dence that there was, at the time of the test, an alcohol concentration of ten-hundredths (0.10) or
more shall be admitted as prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alco-
hol." Id § 756(c). See also Bailey v. State, 633 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (contrasting
the differences between driving while impaired and driving while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor). For the purposes of this Note, the acronym "DWI" is intended to be synonymous
with "DUI," the acronym typically used in Oklahoma for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
3. In Oklahoma, traditional law enforcement techniques, such as the roving patrol acting
upon reasonable suspicion or probable cause, accounted for 34,616 DWI arrests in 1982.
OKLAHOMA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN OKLAHOMA-UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORT 56 (1982). Nationwide, more than 1,300,000 DWI arrests occurred in 1981. NATIONAL
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY-DEFICIENCIES IN ENFORCEMENT, JUDICIAL AND TREAT-
MENT PROGRAMS RELATED TO REPEAT OFFENDERS 4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as SAFETY STUDY].
4. For an expanded discussion of roadblock operation, see infra notes 86-131, 178-94 and
accompanying text. As of September 1, 1984, "sobriety checkpoints" were being used in Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia. SAFETY STUDY, supra note 3, at 98.
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to a seizure which is executed without some prior form of individual-
ized suspicion.' Nonetheless, law enforcement and traffic safety officials
have assumed that the DWI roadblock is constitutionally permissible
under guidelines set forth in the Supreme Court dicta of Delaware v.
Prouse.6
In Prouse, the Court rejected the police practice of using roving
patrols to stop automobiles and check for drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations without some prior individualized suspicion that the
driver was unlicensed or that the vehicle was unregistered.7 In charac-
terizing this practice as unconstitutional under the fourth amendment,
the Court noted in dicta that states were not precluded from developing
less intrusive methods of enforcement.' The Court went on to point
out that the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops is one possible alternative." 9
A number of state courts have subsequently interpreted the Prouse
dicta as legitimizing the use of roadblocks for enforcing DWI laws and
have gone on to uphold the constitutionality of particular DWI road-
blocks. 0 In the recent Oklahoma decision of State v. Smith,II however,
5. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. See generally Howarth, 'Sobriety Road-
blocks' Hobble Us.All, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, at IV5, col. 3 (contending DWI roadblocks are
unconstitutional); Will, Is theACLUBeing Reasonable, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1983, at 80 (approv-
ng use of the DWI roadblock); Checkpoints to Catch Drunk Drivers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 4, 1983, at 65-66 (opposing views on the constitutionality of the DWI roadblock).
6. 440 U.S.-648, 663 (1979). The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, citing Prouse
as a reference, recommended that "[p]olice agencies should apply selective enforcement and other
innovative techniques including ... judicially approved roadblock[s], to achieve a high percep-
tion of risk for driving under the influence." THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIv-
ING, FINAL REPORT 14-15 (1983). See generally NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY:
THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATIONS (1984) (also
advocating the use of sobriety checkpoints).
7. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court stated:
Accordingly, we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not regis-
tered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for viola-
tion of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id
8. Id "This holding does not preclude ... [s]tates from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id
(footnote omitted).
9. Id
10. See infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 86-95, 98-102 and
accompanying text (discussing those cases in which particular DWI roadblocks have been found
to be unconstitutional after implicit or explicit application of the Prouse dicta to the roadblock).
Two courts have, however, analyzed the constitutionality of the DWI roadblock without explicitly
or implicitly relying upon the Prouse dicta. See infra notes 103-08, 127-31 and accompanying text.
11. 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
[Vol. 20:286
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the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denounced the use of the
DWI roadblock, holding that such stops are an unconstitutional fourth
amendment seizure. 2 This Note will review the line of Supreme Court
decisions leading up to and including Prouse, as well as lower court
decisions concerned with the constitutionality of the DWI roadblock.
The Note will then analyze the applicability of the Prouse dicta to the
DWI roadblock, the fourth amendment reasoning used in lower court
cases, and the constitutionality of the DWI roadblock. Based on this
analysis, the reasoning and implications of Smith will then be
examined.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the night of October 2 and morning of October 3, 1981,
Oklahoma law enforcement agencies' 3 established six separate vehicle
roadblocks in Oklahoma County, ostensibly designed for vehicle regis-
tration and driver's license checks. 14 It was later determined that the
real purpose of the roadblocks was to apprehend DWI violators.' 5 In
operating the roadblocks, the agencies would either stop all cars or
every third car. If the roadblock caused excessive traffic congestion,
cars would be waved through without being stopped.' 6 Smith was
stopped at one of the roadblocks, where police obtained evidence of
intoxication.' 7 Prior to the stop, however, the agencies lacked either
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
12. id at 565.
13. Id at 562. The agencies included in the operation were the Oklahoma Department of
Public Safety, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, the Oklahoma City Police Department and the
Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office. Id
14. Id
15. Id at 563-64. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the following factors were in-
congruent with a true license and registration check: 1) the ten officers assigned to each roadblock
were accompanied by supervisors; blood testing equipment; personnel trained to administer blood
tests; breathalyzer equipment; vans for booking, jailing, and transporting offenders; and wrecker
crews, 2) the presence of the District Attorney at the roadblock sites, and the prior orchestration of
the roadblocks by the District Attorney's office and the law enforcement agencies, 3) the location
of the roadblocks in areas containing drinking establishments, 4) the statement by a police officer
that driver's license and vehicle registration violators would not have been arrested, 5) the recent
paucity of license and registration roadblocks in Oklahoma County (the last roadblock was some
10-11 years prior to the October 2-3 roadblock), 6) the admission by the officer in charge of the
operation that the roadblock was designed to apprehend drunk drivers, 7) advance publicity by
the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety indicating that the true purpose of the roadblock was
to catch drunk drivers, and (8) the failure of the police captain in charge of planning the operation
to consult statistics concerned with traffic flow. Id
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Smith was intoxicated.' 8 Nevertheless, Smith was charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol. 19
The Oklahoma County District Court sustained Smith's motion
for a directed verdict and dismissed the DWI charge."0 The state there-
after appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on a re-
served question of law.2' The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
District Court's ruling, concluding that the stop constituted an unrea-
sonable seizure under the fourth amendment. 2
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROADBLOCK LAW
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
23seizures. In determining the reasonableness of a particular police
seizure,24 the Supreme Court has balanced the public interest in imple-
menting the seizure with the affected "individual's right to personal se-
18. Id
19. Id at 562.
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id at 565.
23. The fourth amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Over the past several decades, judicial scrutiny of the fourth amendment
has taken on new significance because of the effects of the exclusionary rule. Under the original
formulation of the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and
seizure is inadmissible in a federal prosecution. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The
Court extended the Weeks doctrine to state prosecutions by holding that states are subject to the
fourth amendment through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). For an exhaustive treatment of the exclusionary rule and of fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence in general, see Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REa. 257 (1984).
24. Justice Stewart has observed that a "seizure" occurs "if, in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion) (footnote omit-
ted). Four justices (Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens) subsequently concurred with
the Mendenhall opinion. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion). At
least one commentator has interpreted Royer as signifying an emerging three-tier approach to
police-citizen encounters:
First, are minimally intrusive encounters that are short of seizures and are beyond fourth
amendment reach. The second tier involves intrusions severe enough to constitute
seizures but not so severe to warrant the probable cause requirement. Third, are arrests
and intrusions of a similar magnitude which can be justified only by probable cause.
Latzer, Royer, Profiles, and the Emerging Three-Tier Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 11 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 149, 163 (1983). See generally Williams, The Dimensions of Seizure.- The Concepts of
"Stop" and "Arrest,"43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982) (discussing the determination of a fourth amend-
ment seizure and distinguishing between seizures that constitute stops and seizures that constitute
arrests).
5
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curity free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 25 The warrant
clause of the fourth amendment further limits police discretion by gen-
erally requiring the issuance of a warrant prior to a search and
seizure.26 The warrant must describe the place to be searched and the
25. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). In Terry, the Court
characterized a brief investigative stop and protective frisk for weapons, "the stop and frisk," as a
seizure and search subject to fourth amendment scrutiny. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The Court went
on to note that this particular type of seizure was a lesser intrusion than a full arrest and, there-
fore, did not require probable cause, the traditional standard necessary for fulfilling the reasona-
bleness requirement when making an arrest. Id at 19-20; see also infra notes 26-29 (discussing
probable cause, arrest and the warrant requirement). Instead, the Court held that seizures falling
short of a full arrest must comply with the fourth amendment reasonableness clause, and that
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quot-
ing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)) (bracketed words in original). After
applying this balancing approach to the facts in Terry and concluding "that there must be a nar-
rowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer," the Court held that in undertaking a stop and frisk "the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant [the stop and frisk]." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 21. But in dispensing with
the need for probable cause, a more rigorous objective standard, the Terry Court also stipulated
that mere "inarticulate hunches" would not suffice in meeting the new standard. Id at 22. For an
analysis of Terry and its effects, see Miles, Jr., From Terry to Mimms: The Unacknowledged Ero-
sion of Fourth Amendment Protections Surrounding Police-Citizen Confrontations, 16 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 127 (1978).
In Camara v. Municipal Court, the lessee of an apartment building was arrested after he re-
fused to allow city housing inspectors to inspect his apartment prior to obtaining a search warrant.
387 U.S. at 525-27. The Court held that a search warrant was necessary for this type of adminis-
trative search. Id at 534. However, the Court further held that this particular search warrant
need not be premised on a showing of probable cause that the particular building was in violation
of the housing code, but rather that inspectors adhered to reasonable administrative standards for
conducting an area search, such search including the building in question. Id at 534-39. Thus,
the search warrant in Camara could be based on reasonable standards such as "the passage of
time [since the previous inspection], the nature of the building. . . , or the condition of the entire
area." Id at 538. Accordingly, the Court held that the specific, individualized quantum of suspi-
cion normally necessary for a finding of probable cause in a criminal investigation could be dis-
pensed with for searches made in the administrative setting of Camara. Id at 534-39. Moreover,
in reaching this result, the Camara Court balanced the public interest in maintaining housing
inspections against the individual's fourth amendment rights, thereby establishing the prototypical
balancing test for ascertaining fourth amendment reasonableness. Id at 536-37; see also See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (utilizing the Camara balancing approach in the search of
business premises). See generally Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 1011 (1973) (tracing the evolution of the balancing test since Camara and See).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The warrant requirement has, however, been dispensed with by
numerous exceptions. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (no
warrant necessary for inventory search of a vehicle in lawful police custody); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222 (1973) (warrant and probable cause to search not required where
voluntary consent given to search); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971)
(warrant not required for the seizure of evidence in plain view during a search incident to arrest);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (warrant not required for search incident to valid
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (warrant not required for search of house
entered by suspect minutes before police in hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:286
persons or things to be seized, and is issued upon a finding of probable
cause27 by a neutral and detached magistrate.28 Although a valid arrest
may occur with or without an arrest warrant, a finding of probable
cause is always required prior to the arrest.29  In Terry v. Ohio,3° how-
ever, the Court held that the probable cause standard was no longer
necessary for certain warrantless fourth amendment seizures falling
short of the intrusion imposed by a full arrest.3" The Terry standard,
known later as "reasonable suspicion," is distinguishable from prob-
able cause because "[r]easonable suspicion requires that the law en-
forcement officer reasonably suspect that a person is engaged in
criminal activity, whereas probable cause requires that the officer rea-
sonably believe that a crime has been or is being committed. 32
The Court has held that a warrantless, investigative stop of an au-
tomobile by a roving law enforcement patrol is a seizure which must be
153-54 (1925) (warrant not required to stop and search moving automobile if probable cause ex-
ists; no warrant necessary for search at international border). Seegenerally2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.1(a), at 3-6 (1978) (discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement); Grano,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CluM. L. REv. 603 (1982) (dis-
cussing the need for a warrant).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Probable cause to seize or arrest a person exists when the facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient to lead a prudent individual to believe that the suspect has committed or
is committing an offense. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citing Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959) ("[e]vidence required to establish guilt is not necessary" for a finding of probable cause).
28. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971).
29. The fourth amendment does not require arrest warrants. See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
Arrest warrants are, however, preferable, and a high degree of deference will be given to a magis-
trate's finding of probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). None-
theless, the obvious logistical problem of obtaining a warrant prior to every arrest makes the arrest
warrant impractical in many situations. In such instances, probable cause must be determined by
the arresting officer rather than by a magistrate. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
416-24 (1976) (police may make warrantless public felony arrest based solely on probable cause);
Raymer v. City of Tulsa, 595 P.2d 810, 812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (police may make warrantless
arrest for misdemeanor committed in arresting officer's presence).
30. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also supra note 25 (discussing the Court's analysis in Terry).
31. See Terry, 427 U.S. at 20-27.
32. Note, Airport Seizures of Luggage Without Probable Cause: Are They "Reasonable"?
1982 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1090 n.8 (emphasis in original). In Terry, the officer making the stop and
frisk interrupted what he perceived as a prelude to an armed robbery and, therefore, was poten-
tially vulnerable to physical harm. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7. Thus the Court originally applied the
reasonable suspicion standard to the relatively narrow category of police-citizen encounters in-
volving potentially violent crimes and danger to the officer. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972) (stop and frisk validated on the basis of informant's tip). Recently, however, the scope
of the reasonable suspicion test has been broadened to include situations not involving violent
crimes or danger to the officer. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. See generally Green-
berg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall andReid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less Than Prob-
able Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 49, 50-65 (1981) (discussing Terry, the reasonable suspicion test
and the test's evolution in post-Terry cases).
7
Quin: The Constitutionality of Drunk Driver Roadblocks in Oklahoma: Sta
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
DRUNK DRIVER ROADBLOCKS
minimally premised upon reasonable suspicion. 33 Because stopping a
moving vehicle and detaining its occupants-no matter how briefly-
constitutes a seizure under the fourth amendment,34 the law enforce-
ment roadblock has also been implicated as a seizure.35 Yet stops
made at an investigatory roadblock, like the DWI roadblock, are rarely
based upon some prior individualized suspicion that the driver of the
stopped vehicle is engaged in criminal activity.36
When faced with this dilemma, some courts have concluded that
particular DWI roadblocks have imposed unreasonable seizures which
excessively intrude upon the stopped motorist's fourth amendment
rights.37 Other courts have held that particular DWI roadblocks do not
violate the fourth amendment.38  This section of the Note begins by
considering the Supreme Court's treatment of the law enforcement
roadblock. The analysis thereafter shifts to an elucidation of the rea-
soning lower courts have employed in determining the constitutionality
of DWI roadblocks.
A. The Immigration Control Cases
Modem case law applicable to the police use of roadblocks has
evolved primarily as a result of a stream of immigration control cases
brought before the Supreme Court in the 1970's. In 1973, the Court in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 9 prohibited the Border Patrol from
using roving patrols to make random vehicular searches at points re-
moved from the border or its functional equivalent.40  Because the
33. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (discussed infra notes 60-69 and accompa-
nying text); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (discussed infra notes 50-53
and accompanying text); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (upholding
roving Border Patrol stop for questioning after inferences based on "totality of the circumstances"
yielded a reasonable suspicion).
34. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653.
35. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
36. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, _ 427 A.2d 131, 133 n.4 (Law Div.
1980) (investigating officer possessed no suspicion to believe that defendant was violating any law
prior to being stopped at the DWI roadblock); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 393 (S.D. 1976)
(prior to smelling alcohol on defendant's breath while checking defendant's license, investigating
officer possessed no prior suspicion that defendant was violating any law).
37. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
39. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
40. Id at 273. The Border patrol utilizes three methods of detection along inland roadways:
permanent checkpoints usually at or very near the international border, temporary checkpoints,
and roving patrols. Id at 268. The Border Patrol used the latter method to stop defendant's
vehicle some 25 miles from the Mexican-U.S. border. Id at 267-68. Although the officers making
the stop lacked either probable cause or a search warrant, a search which eventually yielded a
quantity of marijuana was conducted. Id at 267. The agents who conducted the search justified
19841
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Court could not find adequate precedent to support the Border Patrol's
practice,41 it concluded that the roving patrol vehicular search could
only be upheld as constitutional if based upon probable cause, warrant,
or consent.42 Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggested that the
roving patrol searches could be upheld if executed pursuant to an area
warrant procedure.43
Two years later, the Supreme Court continued its Almeida-
Sanchez line of analysis with United States v. Or/i4 and United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce.45 In Ortiz, the Court extended its Almeida-Sanchez
probable cause or consent requirement to Border Patrol vehicular
searches at traffic checkpoints removed from the border or its func-
tional equivalent.46 In support of the Border Patrol practice of making
their actions by citing the Immigration and Nationality Act, "which simply provides for warrant-
less searches of automobiles and other conveyances 'within a reasonable distance from any exter-
nal boundary of the United States.'" Id at 268 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952)). Under regulations set forth by the Attorney General, a
"reasonable distance" was defined as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States." Id (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1957)). Defendant, a Mexican citizen with a valid
work permit, contended that the search of his vehicle was violative of the fourth amendment, and
that the evidence obtained by the search should not have been admitted as evidence against him.
Id at 267.
41. Id at 269-73. The Court cited Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in observing
that a warrantless stop and search of a moving vehicle must be premised upon probable cause.
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269-70. The Court then pointed out that the administrative search
enunciated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), was similarly at odds with the
facts in Almelda-Sanchez.
The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members
of the Border Patrol, who did not have a warrant, probable cause, or consent. The
search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that
'the discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to
the inspection.
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33) (footnote omitted). More-
over, as the search of the Almeida-Sanchez vehicle took place away from the border or its func-
tional equivalent (e.g., "searches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border," or at an interior airport receiving
non-stop international flights), the Court was unwilling to apply the border search exception ar-
ticulated in Carroll Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73; see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (ob-
serving that "travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of
national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as enti-
tled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in").
42. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
43. Id at 283-85 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell set forth four criteria which might
be applicable in determining the existence of probable cause for an area search warrant: 1) the
frequency of illegal aliens known to be within a particular area, 2) the proximity of the area to the
border, 3) the extensiveness and geographic features of the area, and 4) the probable degree of
interference with the rights of innocent motorists. Id at 283-84.
44. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
45. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
46. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896-97. The defendants were stopped by the Border Patrol at a perma-
nently established immigration checkpoint located in San Clemente, California, some 66 miles
from the Mexican border. Id at 891-93. Normal checkpoint operation allowed the investigating
9
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such searches without probable cause or consent, the government con-
tended that the predetermined location of the fixed checkpoints re-
duced field officer discretion in deciding which cars to search.47 In
addition, the government argued that motorist anxiety at a fixed check-
point was comparatively less than the anxiety produced by the A-
meida-Sanchez roving patrol stop and search.48 The Court recognized
that reduced motorist anxiety and officer discretion would be signifi-
cant in determining the reasonableness of a vehicle stop, but remained
unpersuaded that these factors alone could justify a dismissal of the
probable cause requirement necessary for a full vehicular search.49
Brignoni-Ponce, however, held that a roving Border Patrol stop of
a moving vehicle could be undertaken if the officer was "aware of spe-
cific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
that reasonably warrant suspicion" that the vehicle contained illegal
aliens.50 In arriving at this less than probable cause standard, the
Court balanced the strong governmental interest in restricting the flow
of illegal aliens against the "modest" intrusion of a roving patrol stop
Border Patrol officer to stop a car if anything about the car or its occupants led the officer to
believe that the car contained illegal aliens. Id at 893-94. After stopping the car and asking the
occupants about their citizenship, the officer could, upon a persistence or furtherance of his suspi-
cion, inspect the car for hidden aliens. Id at 894. Places susceptible to inspection included the
trunk, under the hood, and beneath the chassis. Id at 894 n.l. Although the Border Patrol lacked
any particular reason to suspect that the defendant's vehicle contained illegal aliens, the vehicle
was searched and found to contain three illegal aliens hidden in the trunk. Id at 892.
47. Id at 894. The government reasoned that since the choice of the checkpoint's location
was "determined by high-level Border Patrol officials," field officer discretion at the checkpoint
was more limited than that of a roving patrol officer. Id
48. Id at 894-95. "Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists." Id at 894. Whereas at checkpoints, "the motorist can see that
other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." Id at 895.
49. Id The Court noted that the checkpoint's procedural regularity "does not mitigate the
invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the
likelihood of embarrassment." Id The Court also observed that the low percentage of vehicles
actually stopped for questioning or to be searched at the San Clemente checkpoint (3%) indicated
that the officers maintained a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. Id
at 896.
50. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. Officers parked at the San Clemente checkpoint pursued
and stopped defendant's car after noting that the three occupants appeared to be of Mexican
descent. Id at 874-75. After questioning the occupants about their citizenship, the officers learned
that the two passengers were illegal aliens. Id at 875. Brignoni-Ponce, the driver, was subse-
quently charged with transporting illegal aliens. Id As justification for the stop, the government
relied on two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These sections permitted a Border
Patrol agent, prior to obtaining a warrant, "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an
alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States" and allowed for warrantless automo-
bile searches near United States borders. Id at 876-77 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 287(a)(1), (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), (3) (1952)).
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/6
TULSA LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 20:286
which was brief and investigatory in nature.5' The Court concluded
that the limited nature of the intrusion allowed for brief investigatory
stops premised on facts not amounting to probable cause.52  In pro-
claiming "reasonable suspicion" as the standard for Border Patrol in-
vestigatory stops, the Court went on to state that once the stop had been
made "[t]he officer may question the driver and passengers about their
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be
based on consent or probable cause."53
In United States v. Marinez-Fuerte,54 the Court upheld the Border
Patrol's practice of stopping a vehicle for brief citizenship questioning
at a permanent checkpoint in the absence of an individualized suspi-
cion that the vehicle contained illegal aliens.55 The Court decided that
in this instance the intrusion on fourth amendment rights was minimal
and, therefore, outweighed by the substantial public interest in main-
51. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-80. The government claimed that roving patrol stops
could usually be accomplished within a minute, requiring only a response to a query aimed at the
occupant's legal right to be in the United States and the possible production of documentation
evidencing that right. Id at 880. Moreover, "visual inspection is limited to those parts of the
vehicle that can be seen by anyone standing alongside." Id (footnote omitted).
52. Id The Court also noted "the importance of the governmental interest at stake .. and
the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border." Id at 881.
53. Id at 881-82. "As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation.'" Id. at 881 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). The Court also
concluded that the mere glimpse of a person within a moving vehicle who appeared to be of
Mexican descent did not comport with its "reasonable suspicion" requirement. BrignoniPonce,
422 U.S. at 885-87.
54. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In conjunction with Martinez-Fuerte's case, the Court also heard
Sfuentes v. United States, a case in which Sifuentes contended that the operation of a permanent
immigration checkpoint near Sarita, Texas should have been authorized in advance by judicial
warrant. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 549-50. The Court rejected this contention, noting first
"that the visible manifestations of the field officer's authority at a checkpoint" gave adequate
assurances to motorists that the officers were acting lawfully. Id at 564-65. The Court also found
that the additional purposes of a warrant, preventing "hindsight from coloring the evaluation of
the reasonableness of a search or seizure" and utilizing the judgment of a neutral magistrate in-
stead of the acting officer, were rendered inapplicable by the location and operational method of
the checkpoint, and the deference given to "the administrative decisions of higher ranking offi-
cials." Id at 565-66.
55. Id at 562. The San Clemente checkpoint was designed so that a "point" officer could
either allow oncoming northbound traffic to pass through the checkpoint without an oral inquiry
and visual inspection, or be diverted to a secondary area for brief questioning (usually three to five
minutes) about citizenship and immigration status. Id at 546-47. Although the government ac-
knowledged that suspicion about a particular vehicle could be used as a basis for diverting the
vehicle into the secondary area, it conceded that no such articulable suspicion existed when it
directed Martinez-Fuerte's vehicle into the secondary area. Id at 547. A check of Martinez-
Fuerte's documents indicated that he was a lawful resident, but that his two passengers were
illegal aliens. 1d After being charged with transporting illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte moved to
suppress the evidence obtained at the checkpoint on the basis that the failure to use articulable
suspicion violated his fourth amendment rights. ld at 547-48.
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taining the checkpoint procedure.5 6 After observing that "the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized]
suspicion," Justice Powell's majority opinion, satisfied with the proce-
dural safeguards surrounding the checkpoint stop, concluded that the
checkpoint stop and questioning could be carried out in the absence of
some individualized suspicion.5 7 But, as in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court
stipulated that, "[a]ny further detention. . . must be based on consent
or probable cause."" s Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their dissent-
ing opinion, denounced any type of departure from an objective stan-
dard and urged affirmance of the reasonable suspicion approach
adopted previously in Brignoni-Ponce5 9
B. Delaware v. Prouse
The line of immigration control cases was finally interrupted in
1979 by Delaware v. Prouse.60 In Prouse, the Court concerned itself
with the police practice of stopping moving vehicles and making
driver's license and vehicle registration checks without reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause to believe that the driver or the car's occu-
pants were in violation of any law.6 ' The State of Delaware contended
that the governmental interest in conducting standardless spot checks
56. Id at 562. Regarding the governmental interest in making checkpoint stops without
some individualized quantum of suspicion, the Court noted the necessity of maintaining a traffic
checking program as a means to control the influx of illegal aliens. Further, the Court noted the
impracticality of requiring the reasonable suspicion standard where "the flow of traffic tends to be
too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car." Id at 556-57. The Court then referred
to Brignoni-Ponce and Orliz, contrasting the relatively high "subjective" degree of anxiety and
intrusion inflicted by a roving patrol stop, with the much lower level of subjective intrusion found
in the brief questioning and visual inspection at a permanent checkpoint stop. Id at 558. Fur-
thermore, the Court indicated, routine permanent checkpoint stops only minimally interfere with
legitimate traffic since "motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or
may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere." Id
at 558-59. The potential for excessive field officer discretion was found to be minimized by the
"regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated" and the selection of the
checkpoint's location by high level officials. Id at 559.
57. Id at 561-62. The Court also noted that individuals have less expectation of privacy in
their automobiles than in their homes and, thus, the former has been afforded a lesser degree of
fourth amendment protection. Id at 561.
58. Id at 567 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882).
59. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 569-578 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissenters noted that "even in the exceptional situations permitting intrusions on less than prob-
able cause, it has long been settled that justification must be measured by objective standards."
Id at 569. Thus, officer "[clonduct, to be reasonable, must pass muster under objective standards
applied to specific facts." Id
60. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
61. Id at 650. Prouse was arrested for possession of marijuana after the patrolman who
stopped his car smelled marijuana smoke and discovered marijuana in plain view on the car's
floor. Id The patrolman who made the stop later testified that prior to the stop he had observed
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to promote highway safety far outweighed the fourth amendment in-
trusion suffered by the detained person.6 2 After reviewing its holdings
in Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, the Court initially rejected Del-
aware's position by observing that the physical and psychological intru-
sion suffered by the detainee of a spot license check was no less than
the degree of intrusion sustained by a roving Border Patrol stop. 3
Though agreeing with Delaware's premise that highway safety was im-
portant, the Court nevertheless rejected this type of spot check.64 The
Court noted that neither the probable rate of apprehension of license
and registration violators, nor the probable deterrence of potential vio-
lators65 could justify "subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the
roads to a seizure-limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions
but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable-at the unbridled discre-
tion of law enforcement officials."66 The Court thereafter held that the
roving patrol stop utilized to make license and registration checks
would be constitutional only if the investigating officer had a prior "ar-
ticulable and reasonable suspicion" that the driver was unlicensed or
that the car was unregistered.67 In dicta, the Court suggested that the
preceding holding did not preclude the "States from developing meth-
ods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
no traffic violations and that his only basis for stopping the car was to check the driver's license
and registration. Id
62. Id at 655.
63. Id at 657. The Court pointed out that both types of stops involved the possibility for an
"unsettling show of authority" and served to restrict freedom of movement. Id The Court also
decided that both types of stops were inconvenient, time consuming and likely to "create substan-
tial anxiety." Id
64. Id at 658-59.
65. Id at 661. In evaluating the probable effectiveness of the random license check, the
Court noted that the foremost method of enforcing traffic and safety regulations is to act upon
observed violations. Id at 659. Since operators "without licenses are presumably the less safe
drivers whose propensities may well exhibit themselves . . . it must be assumed that finding an
unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than
finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of drivers." Id
Moreover, "[i]t seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are driving
without a license is very small and that the number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in
order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed." Id at 659-60. The Court also found
the likely deterrent effects of the spot check on license violators to be marginal. Id at 660. Be-
cause license plates evidencing proper registration are readily observable without stopping the
vehicle, the Court found even less justification for this component of the Prouse stop. Id
66. Id at 661.
67. Id at 663. The Court was emphatic in pointing out that individuals operating or travel-
ling in automobiles do not lose all expectation of privacy because the automobile is subject to
governmental regulation. Id at 662. "[P]eople are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection
when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests
when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles." Id at 663.
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unconstrained exercise of discretion,"68 and that "[q]uestioning of all
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. 69
The confused state of affairs surrounding contemporary DWI road-
block jurisprudence can be partially attributed to the variety of trouble-
some issues left unanswered by Prouse and its concluding dicta.
While Prouse explicitly condemned "the unbridled discretion of
police officers" in making random license and registration stops and the
excessive degree of intrusion suffered by the stopped motorist,7" it left
little guidance as to how the suggested alternative to the random stop-
the license and vehicle registration roadblock--could be operated in a
manner which avoided the pitfalls of excessive officer discretion and
motorist intrusion.7 As the Prouse Court neglected to incorporate into
its analysis a thorough discussion of the permanent roadblock stop an-
nounced as constitutional in Martinez-Fuerte,7" it can only be presumed
that the Martinez-Fuerte roadblock was intended to serve as the model
for the license and registration roadblock. Even if this presumption is
in fact what the Prouse Court intended,73 a close reading of Prouse in-
dicates that the decision was aimed only at the relatively narrow cate-
gory of driver's license and vehicle registration checkpoints, not at the
DWI roadblock.74 Thus, a specific review of the characteristics neces-
sary for the operation of a constitutional DWI roadblock was never
undertaken. Correspondingly, the Prouse Court did not articulate and
evaluate the possible state interests in operating a DWI roadblock, and
therefore did not consider how these interests might figure into its
fourth amendment balancing test.
68. Id
69. Id Justices Blackmun and Powell, in their concurring opinion, assumed "that the Court's
reservation also includes other not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given
point) that equate with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop." Id at 664 (Blackmun,
J., and Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 663.
71. See infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text; see also Note, Fourth Amendment-Search
and Seizure-Random Spot Checks/or Driver's License and Vehicle Registration Are Unreasonable
Absent a Reasonable Suspicion that a Law Has Been Violated Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(1979, 7 Am. J. CRIM. L., 395, 407-11 (1979) (examining the lack of guidelines set forth by the
Prouse Court).
72. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
73. Note, however, that the Martinez-Fuerte roadblock was permanent, whereas a Prouse-
type roadblock would probably be temporary in nature. Given this probable operational differ-
ence, judicial transference of the Martinez-Fuerte model to a Prouse-type situation would most
likely require explicit modification extending beyond mere tacit acceptance.
74. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
1984]
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C. The Unsettled Legacy of Prouse
In the years following the Prouse decision, litigation concerning
the use of roadblocks has arisen in both state and lower federal courts.
This litigation can be roughly divided into cases where the primary
purpose of the roadblock was for driver's license and vehicle registra-
tion checks,7" and cases where the primary purpose was to apprehend
individuals for DWI or some other type of violation.76 True driver's
license and vehicle registration checkpoints have generally been upheld
as constitutional.77 DWI roadblocks, either overtly designed to appre-
hend the drunk driver or operated under the guise of checking for
licenses and vehicle registrations, have, however, received conflicting
reviews.78
1. The True Driver's License and Vehicle Registration
Roadblock
An example of the reasoning used to uphold the constitutionality
75. See, e.g., United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S.
832 (1981); United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089, 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
926 (1980); see also infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing license and vehicle regis-
tration check roadblocks).
76. In addition to employing the roadblock as a method for apprehending drunk drivers, law
enforcement officials have constitutionally used the roadblock to apprehend the escaped convict
or fleeing suspect. See United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 39-41 (4th Cir.) (roadblock used to
apprehend fleeing suspect), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); Perry v. State, 422 So. 2d 957, 958
(Fla. 1982) (roadblock used to apprehend escaped convict). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 9.5 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (discussing roadblocks as a means to detect crime and
apprehend offenders). However, "dragnet" roadblocks designed to identify and apprehend crimi-
nal violators without a suspicion of individualized criminality prior to the stop, have typically met
with disapproval. For instance, Arkansas State Police officers, ostensibly conducting a license-
registration checkpoint on an interstate highway, were assisted in the operation of the checkpoint
by the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, the National Auto Theft Bureau, the Arkansas Crime
Information Center, six Criminal Investigation officers, and four Arkansas State Police narcotics
officers with two narcotics dogs. Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106, 113 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(consent decree). Prior to the stops, the Arkansas State Police noted "'that we will make many
arrest[s] for offenses ranging from DWI, Wanted Persons, Stolen Trucks and Cars, Drugs and
Narcotics, and so forth,'" and that the roadblock "'will be highly productive insofar as criminal
and traffic enforcement are concerned.'" Id (quoting an internal police memorandum). After
arrests generated at the roadblock were contested on fourth amendment grounds, the various
agencies involved in the roadblock submitted to a consent decree curtailing the presence of non-
traffic enforcement personnel at future license-registration roadblocks. Id at 118. The agencies
further agreed not to conduct any further roadblocks for general criminal enforcement purposes.
Id; see also State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980) (roadblock procedures designed to
catch unknown park vandals found unconstitutional). While both Garrett and Hilleshiem have
added to the scope of roadblock jurisprudence as a whole, this Note will concentrate on the DWI
roadblock and disregard the dragnet roadblock, as well as the agricultural inspection checkpoint
and the roadblock designed to enforce fish and game laws.
77. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
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of the true driver's license and vehicle registration roadblock in the
wake of Prouse can be found in United States v. Prichard9  In Prich-
ard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
that a temporary driver's license and vehicle registration checkpoint lo-
cated on an interstate highway was constitutionally permissible.8 ° The
two policemen who conducted the roadblock stopped all westbound
traffic except for semi-trucks, which had been previously stopped at a
port of entry.8 ' When traffic started to back up beyond ten cars, the
officers, who had been given prior supervisory permission to operate
the roadblock, would wave all of the traffic through until the area had
cleared.82 The officers would then resume the stopping of vehicles.83
In reaching its decision that the roadblock was constitutional, the
Prichard court relied heavily on the concluding dicta in Prouse and,
thus, compared the random single stop denounced in Prouse, with the
New Mexico roadblock in which nearly all traffic was stopped in a sys-
tematic, non-random fashion.84 Consequently, it can be inferred that
79. 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
80. Id at 856-57; accord United States v. Obregon, 573 F. Supp. 876, 880-81 (D.N.M. 1983)
(New Mexico roadblock operated under circumstances nearly identical to the Prichard roadblock
upheld as constitutional); see also United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089, 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir.
1979) (temporary (24 hrs.) driver's license and vehicle registration roadblock operated by the
Texas Department of Safety deemed permissible), cert. deniea 447 U.S. 926 (1980); cf. United
States v. Silva-Rios, 551 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (temporary Border Patrol checkpoint
located 50 miles from Mexican border and operated for 24 hrs./day for seven days held constitu-
tional under Prouse when all vehicles were stopped and when brief checks for citizenship were
found to be only minor intrusions).
Oklahoma statutes provide that every motor vehicle operator must have an operator's or
chauffeur's license in his possession when operating a motor vehicle, and must display the license
upon a peace officer's demand. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-112 (1981). In a pre-Prouse decision, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the temporary driver's license and vehicle regis-
tration checkpoint was constitutional. Brantley v. State, 548 P.2d 675, 676 (Okla. Crim. App.
1976). Driver's license roadblocks in Tulsa County have been conducted by the Oklahoma High-
way Patrol for many years. Telephone interview with Lt. Jack Green, Troop B Commander,
Oklahoma Highway Patrol (Sept. 10, 1984). These roadblocks are generally conducted at several
well-known, non-interstate highway locations during daylight hours. Id The roadblocks are
timed to avoid rush hour traffic and may involve up to six patrol cars in some locations. Id All
vehicles are stopped at the roadblocks; in the event of excessive traffic build-up, vehicles are
waved through until normal traffic flow resumes. Id Officers check the driver's license, vehicle
inspection sticker, license plate, tires, and brake lights. Id
81. Prichard, 645 F.2d at 855. The roadblock was located on Interstate Highway 40, about
eight miles east of Moriarity, New Mexico. Id Prichard's vehicle was stopped and, after arousing
the two officers' suspicion that the car was stolen, searched with Prichard's consent. Id at 855-56.
The search ultimately revealed 86 pounds of cocaine worth $20,000,000. Id at 855. Prichard
moved to suppress the evidence brought against him on the grounds that it had been obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure. Id at 856.
82. Id at 855.
83. Id
84. Id at 856-57. The court observed that while the Prichardroadblock "may not have been
a '100% roadblock' of the type referred to in Prous4 it is nonetheless a long way from the selective,
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the court felt the excessive degree of motorist intrusion and officer dis-
cretion feared in Prouse had been successfully avoided."5
2. The DWI Roadblock
The constitutionality of the DWI roadblock has precipitated a split
of opinion. At the heart of the dispute is the tension between the indi-
vidual's fourth amendment right to be free from the governmental in-
trusion inflicted by a roadblock, and the use of the DWI roadblock as a
means to further highway safety and counter a genuine public men-
ace-the drunken driver. This portion of the Note examines the rea-
soning employed by state courts which have analyzed the
constitutionality of the DWI roadblock.
State v. Olgaard,8 6 a case which predated Prouse by three years, is
perhaps the first decision to contest the legality of the DWI roadblock.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, while willing to favorably equate
the purpose of promoting highway safety with the Martinez-Fuerte pur-
pose of stopping the flow of illegal aliens, concluded that the temporary
South Dakota roadblock did not meet the degree of permanency man-
dated by Martinez-Fuerte.87 The court examined the relevant factors of
the Martinez-Fuerte decision, including the motorists' prior knowledge
of the roadblock and the amount of non-field officer supervision18 It
concluded that the DWI roadblock was unconstitutional because mo-
torists lacked any prior notice of the roadblock's existence and because
of the apparent lack of non-field officer direction in choosing the road-
block's site.8 9 The court did, however, note that such a roadblock
single car stop denounced in Prouse." Id at 856. The court also noted that the purpose of check-
ing licenses and registrations was legitimate and "[ilf, in the process of so doing, the officers saw
evidence of other crimes, they had the right to take reasonable investigative steps and were not
required to close their eyes." Id at 857.
85. See id at 857.
86. 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
87. Id at 394. The one-night roadblock was part of an Alcohol Safety Action Program con-
ducted by the South Dakota highway patrol. Id at 393. (For a discussion of the Alcohol Safety
Action Program, see infra note 201.) The officer making the stop testified that the roadblock was
"mainly set up for alcohol related offenses." Olgaara 248 N.W.2d at 393. The roadblock in-
cluded four officers, several patrol cars with red flashing lights, and a large stop sign. Id All
vehicles passing in both directions were stopped. Id Prior to stopping Olgaard's car at the road-
block, the investigating officer making the stop possessed no prior suspicion that Olgaard was
violating any law. Id As the investigating officer was checking Olgaard's driver's license, he
detected the odor of beer in Olgaard's car. Id Olgaard was charged with possession of an open
container of an alcoholic beverage and possession of marijuana discovered during a further inves-
tigation of the car. Id
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would be constitutional if authorized by a prior judicial warrant.9"
Although the courts which have found particular DWI roadblocks
unconstitutional after Prouse have not pursued the idea of a prior judi-
cial warrant, they have echoed the need to reduce both motorist intru-
sion and field officer discretion. In Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan,91
excessive field officer discretion in deciding which motorists to stop and
how to operate the roadblock, poor illumination, and traffic backed up
for close to a mile led the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to
conclude that the particular DWI roadblock under review was uncon-
stitutional.92 Similarly, in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of
State,93 the Supreme Court of Arizona observed that a failure to ade-
quately warn oncoming motorists of the roadblock's existence and pur-
pose, coupled with a failure to issue guidelines to inspecting officers for
questioning stopped vehicles, were indicative of an impermissible level
of officer discretion and motorist intrusion. 94 Without empirical evi-
dence supporting the superiority of the DWI roadblock over the roving
patrol acting upon reasonable suspicion, the Ekstrom court was unwill-
ing to sanction the use of a DWI roadblock which involved excessive
intrusiveness and discretion.95 In addition, in Jones v. State,96 the ab-
90. Id
91. 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983).
92. Id at _ 449 N.E.2d at 353. McGeoghegan was one of over 200 motorists stopped at a
one-night roadblock conducted by the Revere, Massachusetts police department. Id at _, 449
N.E.2d at 350. MeGeoghegan was asked for his "papers." Id Subsequently, he showed signs of
having consumed some type of alcoholic beverage, and was then taken from his car to a police
van, where he was given and failed a breathalyzer test. Id McGeoghegan later moved to sup-
press the evidence used against him in the resulting DWI charge. Id
93. 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (en banc). On August 26, 1982 and September 6, 1982,
all southbound traffic on Arizona Highway 93 was stopped at a DWI roadblock operated at the
Kingman, Arizona port of entry. Id The port of entry is a permanent facility consisting of a
building, illumination for nighttime operation, automobile lanes covered by awning, and flashing
traffic control devices. Id The roadblock was operated by the Department of Public Safety, the
Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Transportation and the Cooperative Enforcement
Unit (a drug enforcement unit). Id Motorists stopped at the roadblock were asked to show their
driver's license and vehicle registration while officers looked for signs of intoxication by smelling
the driver's breath for alcohol, shining flashlights in the car, and checking visible containers. Id
at _, 663 P.2d at 993. This detention typically lasted from 30 seconds to 5 minutes. Id In the
event that the driver's documentation was found to be inadequate or if the officers believed there
was a need for further questioning of the driver, the car was led to a secondary area. Id If the
officer had probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated or that some other statute had
been violated, the driver was then arrested. Id After the defendants were stopped at the King-
man roadblock and subjected to the preceding procedure, three were arrested for DWI while the
other was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs and for possession of marijuana. Id
94. Id at _ 663 P.2d at 996. Other objections included the presence of nontraffic duty
officers at the roadblock, and the failure by officers to explain or answer queries about the purpose
of the stop. Id at _ 663 P.2d at 1000 (Feldman, J., specially concurring).
95. Id at _ 663 P.2d at 996. Of the 5,763 vehicles stopped at a number of DWI roadblocks
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sence in the trial court record of information concerning (1) a plan
promulgated by administrative personnel; (2) adequate safety features;
(3) the number of officers involved; and (4) the number of DWI arrests
which could be expected from roving patrols acting upon reasonable
suspicion, prompted the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida to
declare the particular DWI roadblock under review to be
unconstitutional. 9
7
While McGeoghegan, Ekstrom, and Jones denounced the use of
specific DWI roadblocks, each of these cases stopped short of holding
the DWI roadblock unconstitutional per se. The court in McGeoghe-
gan indicated that it might uphold the constitutionality of a particular
DWI roadblock under specially prescribed circumstances.98 The court
noted that compliance with the following factors might lead to a find-
ing of constitutionality for a DWI roadblock: (1) nonarbitrary selec-
tion of motor vehicles to be stopped, (2) adequate observance of safety
precautions, (3) minimization of motorist inconvenience, (4) strict ad-
herence to a preconceived procedural plan, and (5) advance publicity
of the date of the roadblock.99 Likewise, a specially concurring opinion
operated in Arizona on September 6, 1982, 14 persons were arrested for DWI. Id at ._, 663 P.2d
at 993. Three of the fourteen were arrested at the Kingman roadblock. Id; see also infra note 199
and accompanying text (providing an expanded analysis of these arrests).
96. No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla.
file). The Tampa Police Department established the contested DWI roadblock on July 4, 1982, at
about 2:30 A.M. Id
The three northbound lanes of Dale Mabry were blocked off to form a "funnel" requir-
ing all traffic to travel in one lane and to pass by a police officer stationed on the road-
way. That officer was instructed to stop every fifth automobile when traffic was heavy
and to stop every third autombile when traffic was light. The stopped cars were directed
off the roadway into an otherwise unused parking lot.
Waiting in the parking lot were five police officers who were to determine if the drivers
were DUI. The only specific instruction given to those officers was to request the driver's
licenses of the drivers of cars diverted from Dale Mabry into the parking lot. Each
officer was left to his own method to determine whether he believed a driver was DUI.
Id Jones' car was diverted into the parking lot where an officer subsequently decided that Jones
was intoxicated. Id Jones was then arrested for DUI. Id
97. Id The Florida District Court of Appeal did, however, certify to the Florida Supreme
Court as a matter of public importance the following question: "Can a warrantless temporary
roadblock which is established to apprehend persons driving while under the influence of alcohol
and which stops automobiles without any articulable suspicion of illegal activity produce constitu-
tionally permissible arrests?" Id
98. See McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at -, 449 N.E.2d at 353.
99. Id In the process of formulating these criteria, the McGeoghegan court implied that the
concluding dicta in Prouse were applicable to the DWI roadblock. See id at -, 449 N.E.2d at
352-53. Similarly, in the process of evaluating the Arizona DWI roadblock, the Ekstrom court
also assumed that the Prouse dicta sanctioned the use of roadblocks for purposes other than a
license-registration check. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 995-96.
The court in Jones adopted the McGeoghegan approach, but added a factor-the effectiveness
of the roadblock as expressed by DWI arrests. Jones, No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
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in Ekstrom suggested that a DWI roadblock which was implemented
for deterrent rather than investigative purposes, and which was
designed to minimize motorist intrusion and field officer discretion,
could probably survive muster under the fourth amendment. 00 A de-
terrent roadblock, the opinion argued, could be differentiated from the
purely investigative roadblock faced by the Ekstrom court, by the use
of advance publicity warning of the roadblock's presence.'0 t Adminis-
1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file). The court held that the effectiveness of the
DWI roadblock as compared to other less intrusive means of enforcement would be one of the
most important criteria in reviewing the constitutionality of a roadblock. Id
100. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). The
"[object would be to enforce compliance with the laws prohibiting driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs by deterring such people from going upon the highway at all." Id Justice Feld-
man arrived at the deterrent roadblock concept by applying the balancing test of Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Id at _ 663 P.2d at 998; see also supra note 25 (discussing the
Camara balancing test). After noting the strong governmental interest in deterring drunk driving,
Justice Feldman asserted that that interest could not be met by traditional enforcement methods
comporting with reasonable suspicion. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _, 663 P.2d at 998-1000. Justice
Feldman then proposed that stops involving minimal questioning and visual inspection would be
acceptable if "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the con-
duct of individual officers." Id at _ 663 P.2d at 1000 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979)); see also infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
On November 21, 1984, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled on the constitutionality of a
DWI roadblock operated by the Tucson Police Department. State v. Superior Court, No. 17679-
SA (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file). In accordance with
Ekstrom, the court reiterated the need for an administratively preconceived set of guidelines for
operating the roadblock and advance publicity warning of the roadblock's existence. Id After
noting that the Tucson police had followed both of these suggestions, the court engaged in a
balancing of interests involving "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty." Id (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)). Predictably, the
court had little trouble in deciding that the first factor had been met. State v. Superior Court, No.
17679-SA (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1984) (available on LEXIS, State library, Ariz. file). Despite the admis-
sion by the Commander of the Traffic Enforcement Division that "'in doing a checkpoint opera-
tion you will end up with about half of the amount of the arrests that the same officer deployed in
the field would produce,'" the court decided that the second factor in the balancing test could still
be met since "the sobriety stops were intended primarily for deterrence." Id To this end, the
court noted that the percentage of alcohol-related motor vehicle injuries decreased slightly after
the Tucson roadblocks were implemented. Id Finally, the court observed that both the objective
and subjective intrusions endured by motorists stopped at the checkpoint were minimal. Id; see
also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59 (discussing objective and subjective motorist intrusion).
The court concluded that "[gliven the gravity of the problem, a compelling need for the state to
take strong action against drunk drivers, and the minimal intrusion created by these stops, we hold
the stops in this case passed constitutional muster." State v. Superior Court, No. 17679-SA (Ariz.
Nov. 21, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file).
101. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at - 663 P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). Justice
Feldman realized that while the purposes behind a deterrent roadblock may be different from
those behind the investigative roadblock, the net operational effect of the deterrent roadblock
would be similar. Id "Obviously a stop for the purpose of questioning and visual inspection
regarding sobriety may lead to particularized suspicion justifying further police action in some
cases." Id at _ 663 P.2d at 1001 n.4. For a further discussion of DWI roadblock deterrence, see
infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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trative planning of the roadblock was also suggested.'0 2
Unlike the holdings in McGeoghegan, Ekstrom and Jones, which
denounced particular roadblocks, the court in People v. Barley'0 3
found the DWI roadblock to be unconstitutional per se.t° In reaching
this outcome, the court implicitly rejected the Prouse dicta and, instead,
placed direct analytical reliance on a balancing of the interests involved
in operating the DWI roadblock. 0 5 Specifically, the court considered
"(1) the gravity of public concern served by the seizure; (2) the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest and; (3) the severity of
the interference with individual liberty."'1 6 An analysis of these factors
led the court to conclude that "DUI roadblocks involve a significant
degree of intrusion and are of speculative deterrent value when com-
pared to less intrusive means of enforcement."'107 Accordingly, "the
government interest in detecting drunk drivers by employing road-
blocks does not outweigh the resulting public inconvenience and inter-
ference with the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.' t08
The first post-Prouse case to support the constitutionality of the
102. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J., specially concurring).
103. 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984). The contested roadblock was operated in
Macomb, Illinois on December 18, 1982 by officers from the McDonough County Sheriff's De-
partment, Macomb City Police, Illinois State Police and the Illinois Secretary of State Police. Id
at - 466 N.E.2d at 347. The roadblock was operated from approximately midnight to 2:00 A.M.
on a five-lane street "between the city's only all-night restaurant and the central business district."
Id Bartley was stopped at the roadblock and eventually arrested for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. Id
104. Id at _ 466 N.E.2d at 349.
105. See id at _, 466 N.E.2d at 347-48.
106. Id at _ 466 N.E.2d at 348 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). For a further
discussion of the fourth amendment balancing test, see infra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
107. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at - 466 N.E.2d at 349. In assessing the first factor of the
balancing test, the court pointed out that while "drunk drivers are a grave menace to the public
and that stronger measures are needed to cope with the problem," enforcement options which are
less intrusive than roadblocks are available for detecting drunk drivers. Id at _ 466 N.E.2d at
348; see also infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of less intrusive
enforcement methods). The court went on to note "that the State has failed to demonstrate the
superiority of a roadblock over these less intrusive alternative means of deterrence." Bartley, 125
Ill. App. 3d at - 466 N.E.2d at 348. Turning to the third factor, the degree of intrusion caused
by the roadblock, the court observed that DWI roadblocks involved a significant, rather than
minimal, degree of intrusion:
In reality, DUI roadblocks are designed to be set up at night, without warning and at
locations which are constantly changing. Motorists are often unaware of the reason for
the stop prior to being asked to display their driver's license. Lights are shined into their
eyes and officers peer into the passenger compartment of their automobile. Although
field officers generally have no discretion over who to stop, we are unaware of any crite-
ria used by supervisory officers in determining the need, location, time and duration of a
roadblock.
Id
108. Id at _, 466 N.E.2d at 349.
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DWI roadblock was State v. Coccomo.t0 9 In this trial court decision,
the court concluded that the police practice of stopping every fifth car
at a temporary DWI roadblock in the early morning hours constituted
a minimal fourth amendment intrusion, easily outweighed by the pub-
lic interest in apprehending drunken drivers." ° The court initially
reached this conclusion by placing the DWI roadblock under the aegis
of the Prouse dicta."' The court then characterized the DWI road-
block in question as "completely objective in its operation"' 1 2 and as-
serted that motorist anxiety was reduced by the presence of uniformed
police officers, marked police cars, a line of flares, and a street light
above the roadblock.1 3 Thus, when balanced against the state interest
in maintaining the roadblock, the Coccomo court held that "the state's
action must be considered as a reasonable infringement upon the mo-
torist's expectation of privacy.""' 4
Like the stance taken in Coccomo, the Supreme Court of Kansas,
in State v. Deskins,' ' similarly upheld the constitutionality of a partic-
ular DWI roadblock. 16 After a thorough review of DWI roadblock
109. 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law. Div. 1980).
110. Id at _ 427 A.2d at 135. The roadblock procedure was carried out according to a
written policy formulated by the Roxbury, New Jersey police shortly after the Prouse decision. Id
at _ 427 A.2d at 133 n.I The roadblock in question was established around 1:30 A.M. on April
5, 1980. Id at - 427 A.2d at 133. About an hour and a half later, Coccomo's car was stopped as
per the described procedure. Id Coccomo was directed to an adjacent parking lot where he was
unable to produce his insurance identification card. Id The investigating officer detected the
odor of alcohol on Coccomo's breath and directed him to step out of the car. Id Coccomo subse-
quently failed several sobriety tests. Id "At that point, probable cause existed to believe that
defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." Id at _ 427 A.2d at 133 n.5.
11. Id at 427 A.2d at 134.
112. Id at _ 427 A.2d at 135. The court noted that the "police follow specific, defined stan-
dards" and that "[tihe criteria they employ is [sic] purely neutral; no discretion is involved." Id
113. Id
114. Id In upholding the constitutionality of another DWI roadblock, an Idaho trial court
found that the level of motorist intrusion involved in the operation of a DWI roadblock was equal
to that of the Prouse license-registration roadblock and, thus, was minimal. See Idaho v. Baker,
No. 24-6693 (Idaho 7th Dist. Magis. Ct. May 11, 1983).
115. 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
116. Id at _ 673 P.2d at 1185. The one-night roadblock in question was operated by 35 to 40
police officers at an intersection in Topeka. Id at - 673 P.2d at 1177. The operation began at
10:00 P.M. and continued until the early morning hours of the next day. Id The roadblock was
located on an illuminated part of a four-lane highway. Id at - 673 P.2d at 1185. Police cars
with flashing red lights were located at each of the corners of the intersection. Id All of the
members of the roadblock team--the sherifis department, the Topeka police, and the highway
patrol-were in uniform and easily recognizable. Id The team had been previously briefed by
the Topeka police supervisor and advised to check for driver's license violations and signs of
drunk driving. Id. All vehicles travelling along the north-south part of the intersection were
stopped; drivers were then checked for valid operator's licenses. Id at _ 673 P.2d at 1177.
Deskins, after having his car stopped at the roadblock, produced a valid driver's license. Id The
officer making the stop, however, detected the ordor of alcohol emanating from Deskins' car and
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jurisprudence, 7 the Deskins court set forth a list of factors to be "con-
sidered in determining whether a DWI roadblock meets the balancing
test in favor of the state.""'  The factors included the following:
(1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field;(2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the time and dura-
tion of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) ad-
vance notice to the public at large; (6) advance warning to the
individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance of safety condi-
tions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of opera-
tion; (9) average length of time each motorist is detained;
(10) physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of
operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive methods for combat-
ing the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure;
and (13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the
test.'' 9
The court went on to note that "[n]ot all of the factors need to be
favorable to the state but all which are applicable to a given roadblock
should be considered."' 20 Although a dissenting opinion contended
that no specific standards had been established by superior officers, that
no advance warning of the roadblock had been given to oncoming mo-
torists, and that the roadblock was temporary not permanent,' 21 the
majority nevertheless concluded that the factors applicable to the To-
peka roadblock had been met in a way that made that checkpoint
constitutional. 122
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in perhaps the most analytically
asked Deskins to step out of the car to take a sobriety test. Id Deskins failed the sobriety test and
was arrested for DWI. Id Subsequent to his arrest, an inventory search of the car revealed a
small quantity of marijuana for which Deskins was also charged. Id at _ 673 P.2d at 1178.
117. Id at - 673 P.2d at 1178-84. By implication, the Deskins court found the P1rouse dicta
applicable to the DWI roadblock. The court indicated that "[tihe border patrol cases, Prouse and
decisions from other state and federal appellate courts make it clear that not every driver's license
check or DUI roadblock is constitutionally impermissible." Id at _ 673 P.2d at 1184.
118. Id at __ 673 P.2d at 1185. In formulating the factors for its test the Desk/ns court consid-
ered " '[a] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual lib-
erty.'" Id at._ 673 P.2d at 1184-85 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).
119. Id at__, 673 P.2d at 1185.
120. Id
121. Id at __, 673 P.2d 1186-88 (Prager, J., dissenting). Justice Prager also questioned the
effectiveness of the Topeka roadblock. Id at _ 673 P.2d at 1187; see also infra notes 195-203 and
accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of the DWI roadblock).
122. Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1185. The majority noted that officers at the road-
block had been briefed by supervisory personnel of the Topeka police department and specifically
advised to check for licenses and signs of drunk driving; that the roadblock was located in an
illuminated area and marked by police cars with red flashing lights; that detention time was mini-
mal; that all vehicles were stopped; that the officers were uniformed and easily recognizable; and
that the location for the roadblock had been chosen by supervisory personnel. Id
[Vol. 20:286
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extensive opinion to date, reached a conclusion similar to Deskins in
Little v. State.'23 Unlike Deskins, however, the Little court focused on
establishing the roadblock as "a moderately effective technique for de-
tecting and deterring the drunk driver."'' 24 The court further observed
that when "[b]alanced against the State's compelling interest in de-
tecting and deterring drunk driving, the intrusion on individual liber-
ties caused by the checkpoint is minimal."'' 25  Moreover, the court
added, neither the temporary nature of the DWI roadblock, nor the
123. 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984). The DWI roadblocks in question were established in
Harford County, Maryland as part of a three month pilot program beginning on December 12,
1982. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 905. "Checkpoints were ... in operation between 11:00 P.M. and
4:00 A.M. on December 17, 18, 26 and 31, 1982, on January 6 and 21, 1983 and on February 18,
1983." Id The roadblocks were given statewide publicity and the location of one of the road-
blocks was disclosed. Id Little was stopped at one of the roadblocks at 1:50 A.M. on January 1,
1983. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 906. After failing a sobriety test, Little was charged with driving while
intoxicated. Id Little thereafter filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
stop. Id at _. 479 A.2d at 906-07.
124. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 913. The court noted that during the three months the checkpoints
were in operation, alcohol-related accidents decreased 17% in comparison with the preceding
three months. Id In contrast, alcohol-related accidents decreased 12% in neighboring Frederick
County, which lacked sobriety checkpoints. Id Nonempirical evidence of roadblock effectiveness
was also cited. Specifically, the court found that "[t]axi companies reported a surge in business
from intoxicated persons who had been deterred from driving," that group bus charters were
becoming more popular, and that "[p]olice attending the checkpoints found that many drunk
individuals asked a sober spouse or companion to drive instead." Id
Justice Davidson's dissenting opinion was quick to point out that both Frederick and Harford
Counties had achieved a ten percent reduction in alcohol-related accidents when compared with
the same three month period from the previous year. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 919 (Davidson, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Frederick County achieved a 335% decrease in fatal accidents for this time
period, while Harford County achieved a 270% increase in fatal accidents. Id As for the major-
ity's claim of effectiveness in terms of an increase in taxi and charter bus rates and sober driving
companions, Justice Davidson observed that "there was absolutely no testimony. . . to indicate
what if any portion of this modified behavior was attributable to the existence of the roadblock
program." Id. In addition, Justice Davidson pointed out that the effects of a statewide compre-
hensive program designed to improve traditional DWI enforcement methods probably overshad-
owed any decrease in traffic fatalities directly attributable to the DWI roadblock. Id at _ 479
A.2d at 917-18.
125. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 913. The court indicated that:
As a general rule, the constitutionality of traffic checkpoints has been upheld where:
(1) the discretion of the officers in the field is carefully circumscribed by clear objective
regulations established by high level administrative officials; (2) approaching drivers are
given adequate warning that there is a roadblock ahead; (3) the likelihood of apprehen-
sion, fear or surprise is reduced by a display of legitimate police authority at the road-
block; and (4) vehicles are stopped on a systematic, nonrandom basis that shows drivers
they are not being singled out for arbitrary reasons.
Id at _ 479 A.2d at 911. The court's analysis of the Harford roadblock led it to conclude that
each one of these criteria had been adequately accommodated. Id at _ 479 A.2d at 913-14.
Consequently, the court concluded that the Harford roadblock allowed for a minimal level of
motorist intrusion and officer discretion. Id at _, 479 A.2d at 913. The court also noted that "a
driver who stops at the checkpoint but refuses to roll down the car window is allowed to proceed"
and "motorists who do not wish to stop may make a U-turn and follow a different route." Id at
- 479 A.2d at 913-14.
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operation of the checkpoint without a warrant could be considered as
inherently fatal to the roadblock's constitutionality. 126
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals recently upheld the con-
stitutionality of DWI roadblocks in People v. Scott. 127 The court ini-
tially concluded "that individualized suspicion is not a prerequisite to a
constitutional seizure of an automobile which is 'carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of in-
dividual officers.' "128 The court went on to decide that the particular
procedure used in operating the contested roadblock allowed for a per-
missibly low level of officer discretion and motorist intrusion. 29 In ad-
dition, the court indicated that the deterrent purpose of the DWI
roadblock was also constitutionally permissible, 30 and that neither its
transient and temporary nature, nor its efficiency could be construed in
a manner which rendered it unconstitutional. 131
126. Id at - 479 A.2d at 914-15. While the court was willing to admit that the surprise
inflicted by a temporary roadblock was probably greater than that which was imposed by a per-
manent roadblock, it concluded that the Martinez-Fuerte permanent-temporary distinction was
only one of several factors to be used in determining fourth amendment reasonableness. Id at .
479 A.2d at 914. The court inferred that a temporary roadblock established under a systematic
plan would probably be reasonable and that the intrusiveness of the checkpoint would be "out-
weighed by the State's compelling interest in preventing drunk driving." Id As for the need for a
warrant authorizing operation of the checkpoint, the court held that Martinez-Fuerte was entirely
dispositive on this point and that a warrant was unnecessary. .d at _ 479 A.2d at 914-15; see
also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564-66.
127. No. 542 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984). Between midnight and 3:00 A.M. on Saturday, September
25, 1982, the Genesee County Sheriff operated four successive DWI roadblocks. Id at 2-3. Each
roadblock was maintained for approximately 20-30 minutes and operated according to a written
police plan roughly conforming with the procedural criteria set forth in another portion of this
Note. See id at 2-4; see also infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
criteria). Furthermore, "two patrol cars were stationed in the area to follow and observe for possi-
ble violations any vehicle that avoided the roadblock by making a U-turn." Scott, No. 542, slip
op. at 4 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984). Scott was stopped at the third roadblock and arrested for DWI after
the officer making the stop observed signs of intoxication and after Scott failed a sobriety test. Id
at 2-3.
128. Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979); citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-62). For a further discus-
sion of Brown and its implications for the DWI roadblock, see inra notes 160-72 and accompany-
ing text.
129. Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 6-7 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984). As in Bartley, the court made no
mention of the Prouse dicta and relied instead on a balancing of interests approach. Id at 6-10.
130. Id at 7-8.
131. Id at 8-10. With regards to the brief periods of time in which the four Genesee County
roadblocks were operated, the court stated that:
The subjective effect upon a vehicle driver approaching a roadblock is unrelated to
whether it is permanent or was established but a few minutes before the driver ap-
proached it; in either instance his or her observation of it will be measured in minutes if
not seconds. The likelihood of there being the kind of fright or annoyance that invali-
dates a random stop made by a roving patrol is obviated in the case of a temporary
checkpoint by the visible signs of authority which the checkpoint entails-signs an-
nouncing the purpose, lighting, and identifiable police vehicles and the observable fact
25
Quin: The Constitutionality of Drunk Driver Roadblocks in Oklahoma: Sta
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
1984] DR UNK DRIVER ROADBLOCKS
IV. THE SMITH DECISION
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in a unanimous deci-
sion, found that stops made at the Oklahoma City DWI roadblock con-
stituted unreasonable seizures and, therefore, held the roadblock to be
violative of the fourth amendment.' 32 In reaching this conclusion, the
court considered: "(1) the type of checkpoint involved, (2) the purpose
of the checkpoint, and (3) the degree of intrusion and fright endured by
the individuals passing through the checkpoints." 133 Because the road-
blocks were "one night affairs," the court had little difficulty in classify-
ing the contested roadblock as temporary, rather than permanent.134 A
review of the evidence surrounding the roadblock's operation led the
court to conclude that its true purpose was to apprehend drunk driv-
ers.' 35 The court further noted that the subjective intrusion inflicted
upon motorists approaching the roadblock was heightened by the sur-
prise of discovering an unannounced roadblock replete with mobile
booking and jail vans.' 36 The court compared this intrusion with the
lower level of intrusion suffered by individuals stopped at the perma-
nent, limited purpose Martinez-Fuerte roadblock. 37  In making this
that there is a uniform system for stopping cars. The only subjective difference between
temporary and permanent checkpoints is that because its location is known in advance
the latter can be avoided entirely by using a different route, but that difference is mini-
mal as concerns anxiety, especially since a temporary checkpoint can also be avoided.
Id at 8-9 (citations omitted). Turning to Scott's contention that the roadblock was ineffective as a
means of apprehending drunk drivers, the court observed that this contention ignored the deter-
rent effect of the roadblock. Id at 9. In support of the latter type of effect, the court cited statisti-
cal evidence of a 25% decrease in alcohol-involved fatal accidents in New York from 1981 to 1983,
as well as other statistical evidence reflecting a decrease in alcohol-involved accidents. Id at 9-10.
The court went on to state:
The extent to which those results stem from legislative reforms during that period as
distinct from the deterrent effect of roadblocks and other educational and public infor-
mation programs aimed at combatting the problem is not revealed, but in our view is not
of constitutional moment. It is enough that such checkpoints, when their use becomes
known, do have a substantial impact on the drunk driving problem. The State is entitled
in the interest of public safety to bring all available resources to bear, without having to
spell out the exact efficiency co-efficient of each component and of the separate effects of
any particular component.
Id at 10 (citations omitted); see also infra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing the diffi-
culty in determining which factors actually cause a reduction in alcohol-related accidents); infra
notes 204-06 (discussing the problem of ascertaining deterrent effectiveness). For a further discus-
sion of DWI effectiveness as measured by apprehension rates, see infra notes 199-203 and accom-
panying text.
132. Smith, 674 P.2d at 565.
133. Id at 563.
134. Id
135. Id at 563-64; see also supra note 15 (noting factors instrumental in deciding that the
roadblock was actually intended for drunk drivers).
136. Smith, 674 P.2d at 564.
137. Id at 565.
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comparison, the court decided that the potential level of subjective in-
trusion suffered by the stopped motorist was simply too great to uphold
the seizure as reasonable under the fourth amendment.' 38 The court
added that without statutory authority to the contrary, the rationale of
using the state's police power to provide for the public safety and wel-
fare via license checkpoints could not be used as a basis for implement-
ing temporary DWI checkpoints in Oklahoma.139
V. ANALYSIS OF DWI ROADBLOCK LAW
A. The Prouse Dicta and the D WI Roadblock
An earlier portion of this Note contended that the Prouse dicta
were never intended to cover the use of the DWI roadblock.' 40 Instead,
it was suggested that the dicta were specifically directed toward the use
of the roadblock as a means to check for drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations. In fact, with the exception of two obscure and inconclu-
sive footnotes,' 4' Prouse is completely silent on the general issue of
DWI enforcement, let alone the specific use of the DWI roadblock.
Furthermore, it must be asked, would the Court consciously choose to
address the DWI roadblock and the important constitutional issues it
raises through such an inconclusive and indirect forum? While an an-
swer in the affirmative is not inconceivable, it seems unlikely in light of
several underlying distinctions between the license-registration check-
point and the DWI roadblock.
First, the signs of a license violation alone cannot be detected by
simply observing a moving vehicle. The only practical method of en-
forcing the typical state law requiring each driver to carry his driver's
license while operating a vehicle,' 4 is to actually stop the moving vehi-
138. Id
139. Id; see also Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1185-86 ("It might well be advisable that
minimum uniform standards for the operation of vehicular roadblocks be adopted and established
by the legislature or attorney general, rather than leave the determination thereof to local ofli-
cials"). It has also been noted that while statutory authority for implementing a DWI roadblock
might be more defensible in comparison to a non-statutorily defined roadblock, such authority in
and of itself does not necessarily make the DWI roadblock constitutional. See McGeoghegan, 389
Mass. at _ 449 N.E.2d at 353 (footnote omitted); Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 10 n.4 (N.Y. Nov. 20,
1984).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
141. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18, 661 n.24. For a discussion of these two footnotes, the possi-
ble argument they provide for incorporating the DWI roadblock into the Prouse dicta, and the
eventual rejection of this argument, see Comment, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to
Sobriety Checkpoints 20 IDAHO L. REv. 127, 144-45 (1984).
142. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-112 (1981).
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cle and examine the driver's license.143 In contrast, the signs of drunk
driving, such as weaving and erratic driving, would be visible to an
officer on patrol.'" In this instance, enforcement of the typical DWI
law145 is not inherently contingent upon the vehicle stop as the initial
means for detecting a violation. Accordingly, while the license-regis-
tration checkpoint accomplishes the stop and inquiry inherently neces-
sary for enforcement of the license law, the DWI roadblock imposes a
stop and inquiry not inherently necessary for enforcement of the DWI
law.
Second, while the focus of a license-registration checkpoint is on
the driver's documents, the focus of a DWI checkpoint is clearly on the
driver himself. In addition, it is reasonable to assert that the DWI stop
is designed to discover evidence of a crime and is, therefore, an affirma-
tive investigative technique quite different from a license-registration
check designed to enforce laws which are essentially regulatory in na-
ture. Moreover, after considering the spectrum of criminal offenses, it
should be clear that society has placed drunk driving in a far more
serious category than the mere violation of a license or registration law.
A comparison of the sanctions imposed for drunk driving and driving
without a license,146 reflects the far greater onus of criminality currently
attached to a DWI offense. In sum, a drunk driving violation and a
license or registration violation are two very different types of criminal
offenses: the latter falls within a category composed of offenses which
143. See Deskins, 234 Kan. at _, 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting) ("[v]iolations of
motor vehicle license laws. . . are in no way physically apparent through mere observation of
traffic"); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975) (license violations undetectable
through traffic observation).
144. See Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at - 466 N.E.2d at 348 ("An intoxicated motorist can be
easily discerned by a trained officer without having to stop all traffic at a roadblock."); Deskins,
234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting) (drunk driving behavior detectable even
by lay observer).
145. See Act of May 30, 1984, ch. 254, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 950-51 (to be codified at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902).
146. Operating a motor vehicle without a license is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
less than $50.00, but not more than $100.00, and costs for a first offense. Id. at 948 (to be codified
at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-303(a)(1)). A misdemeanor for a second violation within one year of a
previous conviction is punishable by a fine of not less than $150.00 but not more than $300.00 and
costs. Id (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-303(a)(2)). A misdemeanor for a third viola-
tion occurring within one year of a previous conviction is punishable by a jail sentence of not less
than five days, but not more than 30 days, and a fine of not less than $200.00 but not more than
$500.00. Id (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-303(a)(3)). In contrast, the first DWI
conviction is a misdemeanor punishable by jail imprisonment for not less than 10 days but not
more than one year and a fine not to exceed $1,000.00; a second or subsequent conviction is afelony
punishable by sentencing to the custody of the Department of Corrections for not less than one year
but not more than five years and a fine of not more than $2,500.00. Id at 950-51 (to be codified at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902(c)) (emphasis added).
19841
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are malaprohibita, 147 while the former arguably falls closer to and pos-
sibly within a category composed of offenses which are mala in se.'48
Although our judicial system has approved of the use of the roadblock
in enforcing a variety of malaprohibita type laws, 14 9 the same cannot
be said for the roadblock designed to apprehend-en masse and with-
out some prior individualized suspicion-the perpetrator of an offense
malum in se-the thief, the heroin dealer, the rapist, or the murderer. 50
As Smith points out, "[tihere is a vast difference in enforcing immigra-
tion laws and affirmatively seeking out criminals in the manner done so
here."'-"
In light of these distinctions, it seems highly probable that the con-
siderations involved in the judicial scrutiny of a DWI roadblock would
require a far different scope of analysis than that which was employed
in Prouse. The analytical need to address the DWI roadblock on its
own terms, coupled with a close technical reading of Prouse, strongly
suggests that the Prouse dicta were never intended to serve as approval
of the DWI roadblock.
B. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
Justice White, writing for the majority in Prouse, summed up the
fourth amendment balancing test and the determination of "reasona-
bleness" as follows:
147. "Acts or omissions which are made criminal by statute but which, of themselves, are not
criminal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 861-62 (5th ed. 1979).
148. "Wrongs in themselves; acts morally wrong; offenses against conscience." Id at 861.
149. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n.26 (truck weight and inspection regulations); Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (immigration laws); Stephenson v. Dep't of Agr. and Consumer Serv., 342 So.
2d 60 (Fla. 1977) (agricultural inspection laws); State v. Tourtillot, 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (fish
and game laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1980).
150. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(b), at 145 (1978); see also supra note 76
(observing that dragnet roadblocks have usually been found unconstitutional).
No matter how bad the crime may be which law enforcement officers are trying to stop,
they may not abandon Fourth Amendment concerns in their efforts, however commend-
able in purpose, to stop all citizens, including the vast bulk of them who are innocent, in
order to sift out and apprehend violators
Jones, No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla.
file).
151. Smith, 674 P.2d at 565. Smith goes on to suggest yet another distinction between the
DWI roadblock and the license-registration checkpoint:
[In operating the DWI roadblock] the state agencies have ignored the presumption of
innocence, assuming that criminal conduct must be occurring on the roads and high-
ways, and have taken an 'end justifies the means' approach. The Court is not so naive to
think that criminal conduct does not occur regularly in the form of DUI offenders. Yet,
a basic tenet of American jurisprudence is that the government cannot assume criminal
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[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental in-
terests. Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness standard
usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intru-
sion is based be capable of measurement against "an objective stan-
dard," whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. In
those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insistence
upon "some quantum of individualized suspicion," other safeguards
are generally relied upon to assure that the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official
in the field."' 5 2
The Martinez-Fuerte immigration control roadblock and the Prouse li-
cense-registration roadblock are indicative of situations in which other
safeguards were relied upon to guarantee the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. In Martinez-Fuerte, for instance, the Court de-
termined that promotion of the governmental interest at stake far out-
weighed the "minimal" intrusion suffered by motorists subjected to
brief questions designed to elicit compliance with a regulatory law.' 53
So long as the San Clemente immigration roadblock was operated in a
way which minimized field officer discretion and motorist intrusion, the
stops occurring at the roadblock were reasonable despite the absence of
any type of prior individualized suspicion.15 4
The Coccomo, Deskins, Little and Scott courts upheld particular
DWI roadblocks as constitutional where no form of individualized sus-
picion existed prior to the stop.' 55 Apparently, these four courts, along
with the three post-Prouse decisions that held against particular road-
blocks, 56 have implicitly assumed that the DWI roadblock stop is com-
parable in nature to the immigration checkpoint or license-registration
checkpoint.5 7 As suggested earlier, however, the DWI roadblock is an
152. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55 (quoting, respectively, Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 560; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
153. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-62.
154. See id at 558-62.
155. See Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1177; Little, 300 Md. at ... 479 A.2d at 912;
Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at._ 427 A.2d at 133 n.4; Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 5-10 (N.Y. Nov. 20,
1984).
156. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 995-96; Jones, No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file); McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at - 449
N.E.2d at 353.
157. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at .. , 663 P.2d at 995-96; Jones, No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file); Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at
1184; Little, 300 Md. at - 479 A.2d at 907-09, 914; McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at - 449 N.E.2d at
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investigative tool designed to affirmatively seek out a more traditional
form of criminal activity. This type of roadblock is, therefore, not
analogous to the permanent immigration checkpoint or the license-re-
gistration checkpoint, which are specialized exceptions to the "articul-
able suspicion" rule and are designed solely to enforce regulative type
laws. Professor LaFave has likewise concluded that "it cannot be as-
sumed that those cases [Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte] inevitably carry
over to roadblocks conducted for more ordinary or traditional investi-
gative purposes."' 5 8 Accordingly, in order to constitute a reasonable
seizure, it would appear that the stopping of drivers at a DWI road-
block, like other motor vehicle investigatory stops,'5 9 would require
some individualized quantum of suspicion prior to the stop.
The only direct Supreme Court support for concluding otherwise
appeared in Brown v. Texas.160 In that case, two police officers patrol-
ling a known narcotics trafficking area stopped the defendant as he was
walking away from another man in an alley.' 61 Although the officers
later admitted that they did not suspect the defendant of any specific
misconduct, they arrested the defendant when he refused to comply
with a Texas statute requiring a person lawfully stopped to give his
name and address to an officer requesting that information. 162  In a
unanimous decision, the Court found that the stop violated the fourth
amendment. 163 In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Burger elab-
orated upon the need to control field officer discretion:
To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be
based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the
158. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(b), at 85 (Supp. 1984). Professor LaFave
noted that Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte "are grounded on the balancing test of Camara v Municli-
pal Court and a determination that, as in Camara, the particular government interests involved
could not be adequately protected if an individualized reasonable suspicion test were applicable."
Id
[W]e must bear in mind that in cases where the Supreme Court has either expressly or
impliedly sanctioned checkpoint stops, the criminal activity targeted was of such a nature
that there was no other less instrusive but equally effective means of detecting violators.
Transporters of illegal aliens and violators of license and safety equipment laws can
rarely be detected by observing traffic.
Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at - 466 N.E.2d 348.
159. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (roving Border Patrol vehicle
stop); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (same).
160. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
161. Id at 48-49.
162. Id at 49. "A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a
false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and
requested the information." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
163. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-53.
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seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neu-
tral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.
In keeping with speculation that a roadblock designed for general
law enforcement purposes might pass fourth amendment scrutiny if op-
erated without some prior individualized suspicion, but pursuant to a
Brown-type plan,165 approximately half of the DWI roadblock cases
have explored this analytical tract.' 66 The inherent problem with the
applicability of Brown to the DWI roadblock lies in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's reliance upon Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte in formulating his neu-
tral plan approach. 167 In Prouse, for instance, the Court noted that
"[iln those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insis-
tence upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,' other safe-
guards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the
official in the field.' ",16 As Professor LaFave points out, the reasoning
employed in both Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte "reflects a concern with
very special and unique governmental and public interests which could
not be adequately protected if a case-by-case reasonable suspicion were
required."'' 69
Thus, a suggestion that a neutral plan could take the place of indi-
vidualized suspicion in instances where the law enforcement technique
is traditional in nature and focuses on particular suspects, would ap-
pear to run counter to the teachings of Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte, as
well as Terry.170  Accordingly, as DWI enforcement can be imple-
mented on a case-by-case individualized suspicion basis,' 7 ' and as the
purpose of the DWI roadblock stop would seem to fall within the cate-
164. Id at 51 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Martinez-Fuere, 428 U.S. at 558-62) (emphasis
added).
165. See 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(b), at 84-85 (Supp. 1984); see also State v.
Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980) (setting forth a Brown-type neutral plan for imple-
menting a generalized law enforcement roadblock).
166. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 998-1000 (Feldman, J., specially concurring);
Deshins, 234 Kan. at , 673 P.2d at 1181, 1184-85; Little, 300 Md. at , 479 A.2d at 909; Scott,
No. 542, slip op. at 5-7 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984).
167. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
168. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55 (quoting, respectively, Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. at 560;
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
169. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 165, § 9.3(g), at 57; see also supra note 158 and accompanying
text.
170. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 169. But see id at 57-60 (suggesting that a Brown-type plan
might be applicable if the plan addresses "a special problem existing at a certain time and place"
like the park vandal problem in State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980)).
171. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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gory of generalized or traditional law enforcement,17 2 it seems likely,
despite Brown, that some quantum of individualized suspicion would
continue to be necessary before stopping a motorist suspected of drunk
driving.
Nevertheless, most of the courts deciding DWI roadblock constitu-
tionality, whether considering the roadblock in the terms posed by
Brown,17 3 or by analogy to the operation of the immigration checkpoint
in Martinez-Fuerte and the license-registration checkpoint in Prouse,174
have minimized their treatment of the apparent need for some objec-
tive standard to justify the stop, and concentrated instead on the ways
in which the DWI roadblock was or could be operated without some
prior quantum of suspicion. The Coccomo, Deskins and Little courts
utilized this approach to find the particular DWI roadblocks at issue to
be constitutional. 75 The McGeoghegan and Jones courts, while finding
particular roadblocks to be unconstitutional, indicated that under more
carefully prescribed operational criteria they too would uphold the
constitutionality of the DWI roadblock. 76  Finally, Ekstrom de-
nounced the operation of a specific DWI roadblock, but stopped short
of holding the DWI roadblock unconstitutional per se. 1 77 In each in-
stance, the need to minimize field officer discretion and motorist intru-
sion through procedural safeguards permeated the analysis.
1. Reducing Motorist Intrusion-Procedural Criteria for the
DWI Roadblock
Despite the questionable analytical framework employed by the
preceding courts, a further investigation of the criteria which those
courts have found to be necessary for the operation of a constitutional
172. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
173. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 1000 (Feldman, J., specially concurring); Des.
kins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1181; Little, 300 Md. at - 479 A.2d at 909, 913-14; Scott, No.
542, slip op. at 5-7 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984).
174. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at - 663 P.2d at 995-96; Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at
1178-81; Little, 300 Md. at - 479 A.2d at 907-09; McGeoghegan, 389 Mass, at _ 449 N.E.2d at
351-52; Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at _., 427 A.2d at 131-34.
175. See Deskins, 234 Kan. at - 673 P.2d at 1185-86; Little, 300 Md. at _ 479 A.2d at 911-
14; Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at _ 427 A.2d at 134-35; see also supra notes 109-26 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Coccomo, Deskins and Little cases).
176. See McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at - 449 N.E.2d at 353; Jones, No. 83-2547 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file); see also supra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text (discussing AMcGeoghegan and operational criteria that might lead to a finding
of constitutionality for a DWI roadblock).
177. See Ecstrom, 136 Ariz. at , 663 P.2d at 995-96; see also supra notes 100-02 and accom-
panying text (discussing specially concurring opinion in Ekstrom and a 1984 case which upheld
the constitutionality of a later Arizona roadblock).
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DWI roadblock is nevertheless apropos. For until the Supreme Court
clarifies the situation, jurisdictions reviewing DWI roadblock cases
may continue to proceed along the analytical lines taken by some of the
cases in this Note. It is imperative, therefore, that those jurisdictions
which choose to take a Deskins-type approach recognize the factors
necessary for minimizing officer discretion and motorist intrusion. As
Justice Jackson, upon returning from the Nuremburg trials, remarked:
[Fourth amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights but be-
long in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncon-
trolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weap-
ons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only
briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many
admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the
human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disap-
pear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.1 78
Thus, it is suggested first that the planning and authorization of
the DWI roadblock should occur at the administrative level within the
relevant law enforcement agency.' 7 9 Administrative personnel should
set forth a written plan articulating logistical details like the location
and time of the roadblock, as well as the need to systematically stop all
cars or, for example, every fifth car. 180 Moreover, administrative per-
sonnel should carefully formulate the standards field officers should
abide by when ascertaining motorist sobriety at the checkpoint.' 81 Ad-
vance publicity of the roadblock appears to be another essential admin-
istrative task.'82 As one final precaution, at least one commentator has
stated that a judicial warrant to operate the DWI roadblock should be
obtained.'8 3
178. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
179. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at - 663 P.2d at 1000-01 (Feldman, J., specially concurring);
McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at - 449 N.E.2d at 353; see also Marlinez-Fuere, 428 U.S. at 559 (not-
ing that administrative authorization and planning of a roadblock reduces field officer discretion).
180. See Comment, supra note 141, at 154-56; see also Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at _ 427
A.2d at 141 n.1 (internal memorandum setting forth departmental procedure for stopping every
fifth car during light traffic hours).
181. See Comment, supra note 141, at 155-56; see also infra notes 190-94 and accompanying
text (describing standards for motorist-officer encounter).
182, See McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at , 449 N.E.2d at 353 (advocating advance publication of
date, but not location, of roadblock so as to reduce motorist surprise); see also Ekstrom, 136 Ariz.
at - 663 P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (noting probable deterrent effect of
advance publicity).
183. Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L. REv. 1457, 1484-85 (1983) (a warrant requirement would allow for
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The physical characteristics of the roadblock itself are equally im-
portant. As motorist safety is the paramount consideration here, the
roadblock should be located in a non-remote, highly visible area, re-
plete with lighting if nighttime operation is intended. 84 Flashing traf-
fic signals or police car lights, flares and signs should be arranged in a
manner that effectively alerts oncoming motorists of the roadblock's
presence and character.'85 If a high volume of traffic is expected, the
roadblocks should be designed and timed to facilitate the flow of traf-
fic.' 8 6  A secondary area will probably be necessary to meet this re-
quirement as well as the need to provide for a safe place for further
investigation of motorist sobriety.' 87
Field officers stationed at the roadblock should be in uniform and
should strictly adhere to the operational standards previously promul-
gated by administrative officials.' 8  Personnel assigned to the road-
block should consist of officers normally assigned to traffic enforcement
duties; non-traffic enforcement personnel, such as special narcotics de-
tection teams, should be excluded from the roadblock area. 89
While the preceding factors are certainly relevant to the operation
of a DWI roadblock which limits field officer discretion and motorist
intrusion up to the point of the actual stop, they are inadequate for
regulating the actual motorist-officer encounter. To limit motorist anx-
iety, officers should attempt to minimize the time motorists are de-
tained and assuage motorist fears by answering queries as to the
roadblock's operation and purpose.'90 It is also suggested that the of-
evaluation by a neutral magistrate of the roadblock's probable degree of discretion and intrusion);
see also State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D. 1976) (pre-Prouse case requiring authoriza-
tion of DWI roadblock by prior judicial warrant).
184. See McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at - 449 N.E.2d at 353 (observing that poor illumination
detracted from motorist safety); Comment, supra note 141, at 153 (roadblock should be visible for
at least 100 yds.).
185. See Comment, supra note 141, at 153-54; see also Deskins, 254 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at
1185 (several police cars with red lights flashing sufficient); Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at - 427
A.2d at 135 (flares alone sufficient).
186. See McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at 449 N.E.2d at 353 (poor planning resulted in a traffic
jam close to a mile long).
187. See Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at _ 427 A.2d at 135 (adjacent parking lot sufficient).
188. See Deskins, 234 Kan. at ., 673 P.2d at 1185 (officers have no discretion in selecting
motorists to be stopped and are easily recognizable because of uniform).
189. See Ekstro^m 136 Ariz. at._ 663 P.2d at 1000 (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (pres-
ence of non-traffic officers at roadblock evidence of improper roadblock operation); Garrett v.
Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106, 118 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (consent decree) (non-traffic enforcement per-
sonnel should not be present at a license-registration checkpoint since "[iheir presence indicates
the roadblock may be pretextual and could easily lead to abuse").
190. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at - 663 P.2d at 1000 (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (failure
by officers to explain purpose of roadblock found improper).
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ficer be initially limited to the visual inspection and brief questioning
prescribed in Martinez-Fuerte.tgt At least two commentators have
stated that where the behavior of the motorist (slurred speech, blood-
shot eyes, or alcohol on breath) would lead to an articulable suspicion
on the part of the investigating officer that the motorist was intoxicated,
the motorist should then be directed to a secondary area for further
investigation. 192 Only then may the officer require the motorist to step
out of his vehicle and take the requisite preliminary sobriety tests. 1
93 If
probable cause can then be established, more intrusive tests, like chem-
ical tests for blood alcohol, can be administered.194
2. Serving the State Interest
As the preceding guidelines make evident, much of the analytical
effort expended by the courts considering the DWI roadblock has cen-
tered on ways to reduce the intrusion on the individual's fourth amend-
ment rights. In lieu of requiring some individualized quantum of
suspicion prior to the stop at a DWI roadblock, the courts have fre-
quently devised an elaborate set of procedural safeguards designed to
reduce motorist intrusion and anxiety along with field officer discre-
tion. But such safeguards are only applicable to one side of the fourth
amendment balancing process. The ultimate reasonableness of a
fourth amendment seizure can only be ascertained by weighing the
fourth amendment intrusion against the other half of the equation: the
promotion of the state interest served by the intrusion. 19 Obviously,
191. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58.
192. Note, supra note 183, at 1486; Comment, supra note 141, at 155. One problem, however,
in finding articulable suspicion to detain a driver in a secondary area is that evidence-gathering
involves a greater degree of officer discretion. One commentator has stated that:
[T]he license and registration check imposes minimal invasion of privacy and involves
little opportunity for abuse of discretion. Conversely, the drunk-driving investigation
necessarily demands a greater intrusion and requires that the officer exercise his discre-
tion in deciding which motorists must be subjected to further detention. Moreover, the
scenario of the roadblock stop invites abuse of that discretion. Not only are citizens
reluctant to assert their right not to cooperate, but also that right may prove to be illusory
given the understood consequences of noncooperation.
Rogers, The Drunk-Driving Roadblock. Unconstitutional Random Seizure or Justifiable Minimal
Instrusion?, 3 MICiH. RESARCHER 89, 100 (1984).
193. Comment, supra note 141, at 155-56.
194. Note, supra note 183, at 1486; Comment, supra note 141, at 156; see also South Dakota v.
Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983) (refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test can be used as evidence of
guilt and does not offend suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (states allowed to compel a suspect to submit to a blood-alcohol
test without violating suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination).
195. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654; Bartley, 125 I11. App. 3d at , 466 N.E.2d at 348; Little,
300 Md. at - 479 A.2d at 912-14; Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 5-10 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984).
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the state interest in operating the DWI roadblock is grounded in a de-
sire to improve highway safety-a "legitimate" state interest in any es-
timation given the high incidence of alcohol-related traffic fatalities.' 96
The analysis of the government's half of the balancing test, however,
must be extended beyond the mere characterization of the state interest
at stake, to include an assessment of the effectiveness of the fourth
amendment intrusion in meeting the state interest. t97 The efficacy of
the DWI roadblock can be examined in terms of drunk drivers appre-
hended at the roadblock and potential drunk drivers deterred by the
roadblock.' 98
Among the cases reviewed previously, only Ekstrom and Deskins
provide any significant empirical evidence regarding the rate of appre-
hension at the DWI roadblock. In both cases, a rudimentary statistical
evaluation suggests that the effectiveness of the DWI roadblock based
on arrest rates is actually quite low. 99 Correspondingly, this analysis
196. See supra note I (reviewing the annual casualties and economic losses attributable to
drunk driving). The Supreme Court has taken notice of "the carnage caused by drunk drivers"
and pointed out that it has "repeatedly lamented the tragedy." South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct.
916, 920 (1983) (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1957) (Black-
mun, J., concurring)). Moreover, the Court has recognized the "compelling" interest in highway
safety. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 19.
197. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-60 (discussing marginal advancement of state interests
in conducting random license-registration checks).
198. Roadblock efficacy has also been examined in terms of alcohol-related accidents. Little,
300 Md. at __ 479 A.2d at 913; Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 9-10 (N.Y. Nov. 20 1984); see also supra
notes 124 and 131 (discussing, respectively, alcohol-related accident statistics of Little and Scott).
The inherent difficulty in relying upon this statistical data is that a reduction in alcohol-related
accidents may ultimately be attributable to a variety of factors. Pointing to the DWI roadblock as
the sole cause of any reduction in alcohol-related traffic accidents obviates the possibility that
traditional enforcement methods and increased public awareness of drunk driving are also likely
to be major contributors to a reduction in alcohol-related accidents. Furthermore, it is entirely
possible that these factors act synergistically, thereby impairing any attempt to isolate any one
factor as the direct cause for a decrease in alcohol-related accidents. See Cohen, The Legal Con-
trol ofDrunken Driving: A Comment on Methodological Concerns in Assessing Deterrence Effective-
ness, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 149, 150 (1984) (observing "the problem of identification---of being able to
isolate the effectiveness of changes in the law from the impact of other factors affecting drunken
driving and related motor accidents"); Snortum, Controlling the Alcohol-Impaired Driver in Scan-
dinavia and the United States: Simple Deterrence and Beyond, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 131 (1984) (dis-
cussing the interactive network of influences upon alcohol impaired driving). It is suggested,
therefore, that for the purpose of assessing roadblock efficacy, statistical emphasis should be
placed on effects like apprehension rates which can be directly correlated to the DWI roadblock.
Butsee Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 9-10 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1984) (contending that the specific contribu-
tion of the DWI roadblock to a reduction in alcohol-related accidents does not have to be dis-
cerned so long as "such checkpoints, when their use becomes known, do have a substantial impact
on the drunk driving problem").
199. In Deskins, between 2,000 and 3,000 motorists were stopped at the Topeka roadblock.
Deskins, 234 Kan. at __ 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting). Of the 74 violations which were
discovered at the roadblock, 15 were for DWI. Id Assuming that 2,500 motor vehicles were
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indicates that the vast majority of motorists stopped at the roadblocks
were law-abiding citizens deprived of their fourth amendment rights by
a seizure which was not based on any type of prior individualized sus-
picion, and which was ultimately more successful at discovering viola-
tions other than DWI offenses. Preliminary confirmation of this
hypothesis can be found by taking note of the role that timing and
location play in affecting arrest rates. For example, a roadblock lo-
cated near a strip of "drinking establishments" on a Friday or Saturday
night is likely to have a far higher arrest rate than a roadblock located
in a quiet residential area on a mid-week afternoon. Both the Deskins
and Ekstrom roadblocks approach the optimal time and location for
DWI roadblock effectiveness. 200 Thus, the statistics from Deskins and
Ekstrom cannot be regarded as unduly biased because of each road-
block's temporal and locational features. Moreover, even if the more
successful of the two roadblocks (Deskins) could be operated in a way
which doubled or tripled the number of arrests, the rate of apprehen-
sion would still be very low. 2
0
'
stopped at the roadblock, 15 DWI arrests represents a .6% arrest rate. Of the 74 total violations
discovered at the Topeka roadblock, only 20.3% were for DWI. In Ekstrom, of the 5,763 vehicles
stopped at a number of Arizona DWI roadblocks on September 6, 1982, 14 persons or .24% were
arrested for DWI. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 993. Of the 129 violations discovered
during the two days the Kingman, Arizona roadblock was in operation, only 13 arrests or 10% of
the total violations were DWI violations. Id In Jones, "[t]he arresting officer testified that be-
tween 100 and 200 cars were stopped and five or six DUI arrest were made." Jones, No. 83-2547
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file). Because of the
relatively low sample size in Jones, as analysis of these DWI arrests will not be undertaken.
200. The Deskins roadblock was operated on a major city thoroughfare from 10:00 P.M. Sat-
urday until 2:00 A.M. Sunday. Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting).
The Ekstrom roadblock was operated on a major state highway on Thursday, August 26, 1982
from 7:00 P.M. to 12:00 A.M. and Monday, September 6, 1982 (Labor Day) from 3:00 P.M. to 9:00
P.M. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 992.
201. Doubling the number of DWI arrests in Deskins would result in an arrest rate of 1.2%,
while tripling the number of DWI arrests would result in an arrest rate of 1.8%. By comparison, a
follow-up study of arrest rates achieved by jurisdictions involved in the Alcohol Safety Action
Projects (ASAP) of the 1970's (federally-backed programs designed to improve traditional DWI
enforcement), revealed that prior to ASAP implementation arrests ranged from 0-1.5%, but during
the ASAP implementation arrests ranged between .5 and 3.5%. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE-
1978 39 (1979); see infra note 203 (discussing effectiveness of roving DWI patrols). As this study
indicates, the hypothesized range of DWI roadblock arrest rates can be readily achieved without
the use of roadblocks.
Achievement of higher roadblock arrest rates would to some extent be contingent upon a
greater allocation of limited police resources and, of course, a greater degree of intrusion upon
stopped drivers. While a detailed economic analysis of this problem is obviously beyond the
confines of this Note, it seems plausible to suggest that the direct economic costs of diverting
scarce manpower to bolster existing roadblocks or establish new roadblocks, coupled with the
intangible costs of diverting that manpower from other law enforcement duties, may well present
a classic case of diminishing marginal returns. In other words, the cost per arrest in increasing the
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At this point it must be asked whether these same fairly low DWI
arrest rates could be accomplished in a less constitutionally intrusive
manner. As Justice Prager's dissenting opinion in Deskins points out:
[B]etween 2,000 and 3,000 motor vehicles were stopped at the road-
block. A total of 74 violations were discovered at the checkpoint,
only 15 of which were for driving while intoxicated. During this
period of time 35 police officers were on duty, which for the four-
hour period involved a total of 140 man hours. Although it does not
specifically appear in the record before us, it was not unreasonable
for the trial court to assume that the same or greater productivity in
arresting drunk drivers could have been achieved by distributing the
35 officers at various places throughout the city for the sole purpose
of observing erratic driving and stopping and checking drunk
drivers.2 °2
Justice Prager's logic becomes even more compelling after one notes
that DWI arrests at the Deskins roadblock averaged about one every
nine man hours. It is not unreasonable to assume that an officer on a
special DWI roving patrol making stops based on reasonable suspicion
or probable cause could equal or surpass this rate.2 °3
Whether roving patrols have a deterrent effect comparable or su-
arrest rate from, for example, 1.2% to 1.8% will probably be higher than the cost per arrest in
increasing the rate from, for example, 0% to .6%. If this is indeed the mathematical progression
indigenous to DWI roadblock arrests, at some point the costs for each additional arrest will simply
be unjustifiable. The essential economic question, therefore, is to estimate the range in the arrest
rate at which cost ineffectiveness begins to predominate. Potentially, this range could be low
enough to make the doubling and tripling scenarios posed earlier cost inefficient, as well as ineffi-
cient in the sheer number of DWI arrests. A review of two jurisdictions which utilized roadblocks
during the ASAP program "found them not to be cost-effective in terms of the number of arrests
for DWI, and. . . reported that most of the team's time was spent on other than DWI offenses."
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., RESULTS OF NATIONAL ALCOHOL SAFETY AC-
TION PROJECTS 13 (1979). For a further discussion of the economic-side of crime control, see
generally L. PHILLIPS & H. VOTEY, JR., THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CRIME CONTROL (1981).
202. Deskins, 234 Kan. at _ 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting); see also State v. Superior
Court, No. 17679-SA (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file) ("'in
doing a checkpoint operation you will end up with about half of the amount of the arrests that the
same officer deployed in the field would produce' ") (quoting the Commander of the Traffic En-
forcement Division).
203. In a 1973 study of the Alcohol Safety Action Project Unit of the Kansas City Police
Department, it was determined that officers on a special DWI patrol averaged one DWI arrest
every 5.4 man hours. Beitel, Sharp & Glauz, Probability ofArrest while Driving under the Influence
ofAlcohol, 36 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 109, 113 (1975). Similarly, Baltimore County, Maryland found
that roving patrols specifically designed to detect the drunk driver were more effective than check-
points in terms of arrest rates. See Checkpoints to Curb Drunk Drivers?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 4, 1983, at 66; see also Little, 300 Md. at _ 479 A.2d at 918 (Davidson, J., dissenting)
(observing that a comprehensive training program to enhance traditional DWI enforcement tech-
niques in Maryland resulted in a twofold increase in the number of DWI arrests from 1980 to
1982); cf. Sykes, SaturatedEnforcement: The Effcacy of Deterrence and Drunk Driving, 12 J. CRIM.
JUST. 185 (1984) (specially designed DWI enforcement program using roving patrols produced a
statistically significant change in drunk driving as measured by accident rates).
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perior to that of the DWI roadblock is, however, a different and far
more subtle question.2" Undoubtedly, some individuals will be less
likely to drive while intoxicated if they are aware of the increased pos-
sibility of being stopped and apprehended for DWI at a DWI road-
block.2 °5 On the other hand, it seems just as likely that the same effect
can be achieved by roving patrols specifically designed to apprehend
the drunk driver. In either instance, the inherent difficulty in measur-
ing the deterrent effect caused by each method makes empirical estima-
tion and comparison unrealistic, if not impossible.20 6 Thus it must be
assumed that the probable deterrent effect of the DWI roadblock is, at
204. It should be noted that the concept of general deterrence is theoretically divisible into
deterrence caused by the magnitude and terms of the criminal sanction, and deterrence caused by
the probability of rapid apprehension and punishment. See Andenaes, The General-Preventive
Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 960-70 (1966). It has been observed that the latter
form of deterrence has "a moderate deterrent effect for all crimes, while severity acting alone is
not associated with lower rates of crime." Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity
of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 486, 492-93
(1973). As Justice Feldman pointed out in Ekstrom, "[t]he problem is that deterrence by punish-
ment is often ineffective unless combined with a fear of apprehension." Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _
663 P.2d at 1000 n.3 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). DWI roadblocks are obviously aimed at
the "probability of apprehension" component of deterrence.
205. Other drivers, however, will simply change their driving patterns to avoid predisclosed
roadblock locations. Eg., State v. Superior Court, No. 17679-SA (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1984) (available
on LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file); Scott, No. 542, slip op. at 8-9 (N.Y. Nov. 20 1984). Even
when the possibility, but not the location, of a DWI roadblock has been made known, some le-
gally intoxicated motorists may be able to recognize the purpose of the roadblock and choose to
take evasive action prior to being stopped. In Little, for instance, motorists were theoretically free
to make a U-turn before reaching the roadblock or roll up their windows and proceed through the
roadblock without stopping. Little, 300 Md. at _ 479 A.2d at 906. But see State v. Superior
Court, No. 17679-SA (Ariz. Nov. 21, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file) (motor-
ists stopped if observed turning at "No-Turn" sign and followed if observed turning prior to initial
"Reduce Speed Ahead" sign or passing through roadblock without talking to officers). Although
it is unclear whether motorists approaching the roadblocks in Little were aware of these alterna-
tives to an actual stop, it does seem likely that future motorists approaching the roadblocks will be
more likely to exercise evasive action. Accordingly, it can be expected that the deterrent effect of a
roadblock like the one operated in Little would diminish with increased motorist awareness. See
Little, 300 Md. at - 479 A.2d at 920 (Davidson, J., dissenting); cf. H. Ross, DETERRENCE OF THE
DRINKING DRIVER: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 97-99 (1981) (observing that modifications of
legal sanctions are generally effective for deterring the drunk driver for the short-term, but not for
the long-term). But see Phillips, Ray & Votey, Jr., Forecasting Highway Casualties.- The British
RoadSafetyAct anda Sense oflDyj4 Vu, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 101 (1984) (contending that the British
Road Safety Act of 1967, which makes it an offense for a driver to have a blood-alcohol content
above .08%, created a permanent effect in the reduction of fatal accidents); Votey, Jr., The Deterio-
ration of Deterrence Effects of Driving Legislation: Have We Been Giving Wrong Signals to Policy-
makers, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 115 (1984) (suggesting that the deterrent effect on drunk driving will be
difficult to detect if exogenous variables like increases in alcohol consumption, highway traffic
density and driver behavior are allowed to statistically mask the control effect provided by drunk
driving legislation).
206. See generally Cohen, supra note 198, at 149 (noting the methodological and measurement
problems in demonstrating the deterrent effectiveness of criminal sanctions on drunk driving);
Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACI-
TATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95 (1978) (dis-
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best, no better than the deterrent effect provided by roving DWI pa-
trols, and, at worst, marginal or insignificant. In view of this nebulous
range of deterrent effectiveness, practicality suggests that an assessment
of DWI roadblock efficacy should be limited to an evaluation of appre-
hension rates.
Accordingly, the two cases which have provided empirical evi-
dence of apprehension rates at the DWI roadblock indicate that the
effectiveness of the DWI roadblock may be quite limited.20 7 It is sug-
gested, moreover, that less constitutionally restrictive means could be
employed to achieve the same, if not superior, results. On the other
side of the scale, it seems equally clear that the intrusion afforded by a
DWI roadblock seizure, even when executed under the optimal circum-
stances set forth in the procedural guidelines, far outweighs the mini-
mal advancement of the state interest in making the intrusion. Thus, it
is plausible to conclude that the DWI roadblock represents an unrea-
sonable and, therefore, unconstitutional seizure under the fourth
amendment.
C. Analysis of the Holding in Smith
Although Smith ultimately arrives at the correct result in holding
that the Oklahoma City roadblock and the DWI roadblock are per se
unconstitutional, it does so in an analytical manner different from the
model analysis just developed. Moreover, the strong language used by
the Smith court in holding the DWI roadblock unconstitutional is ex-
ceptional.20 This section of the Note examines Smith in light of the
preceding fourth amendment analysis and then reviews the implica-
tions of the court's unequivocal holding.
From an analytical standpoint, Smith is perhaps most remarkable
for its less than full development of the fourth amendment balancing
test. After determining that the Oklahoma City roadblock was tempo-
rary in nature, the Smith court devotes nearly half of its opinion to a
cussing the problems associated with empirical verification of the deterrence theory and the
general scientific inadequacy of data collected in deterrence studies).
207. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at _ 663 P.2d at 993; Deskins, 234 Kan. at - 673 P.2d at 1187
(Prager, J., dissenting).
208. Smith, 674 P.2d at 565. The court stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protection against an unreasonable seizure of the person is
violated by the use of a temporary roadblock as a means to stop all traffic (or traffic at
established intervals) without any articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion
for the stop, for the purpose of seeking out criminal DUI offenders.
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lengthy refutation of the license-registration guise.209 The court then
begins the process of evaluating the reasonableness of the stop by not-
ing the subjective intrusion suffered by motorists passing through the
roadblock.2"' But here the court stops the balancing process short and
jumps to a more theoretical series of policy arguments concerned with
the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise and the general
fear that the DWI roadblock, if approved, could be extended to other
forms of criminal conduct.2 1 While these are certainly important un-
derlying considerations, they cannot replace the analytical need to con-
tinue with an examination of the degree of officer discretion involved
and the actual effectiveness of the roadblock.
The Smith court's use of precedent is equally puzzling. Near total
reliance is placed on Martinez-Fuerte and the distinctions found rele-
vant in that case: the permanent/temporary dichotomy and the em-
phasis on the subjective intrusion suffered by motorists.21 2 But in
choosing to follow this path, one that was taken earlier by the 1976
decision in Oigaard,1l3 the Smith court overlooks the potential implica-
tions of Brown,214 the quintessential Prouse dicta,21 5 and a detailed de-
velopment of DWI roadblock jurisprudence in other states.21 6 It would
seem that a more thorough discussion of recent case law, perhaps along
lines similar to Deskin, 217 would have been more in keeping with the
current importance of the issues encompassed in DWI roadblocks.
Nonetheless, the Smith court correctly concludes that, at least for
the short term, the use of the temporary DWI roadblock in Oklahoma
is unconstitutional. 218  Alternatively, the long term outlook for
Oklahoma, as well as for other states, is not so certain. States other
than Oklahoma will undoubtedly continue to experiment with the
209. Smith, 674 P.2d at 564-65; see also supra note 15 (noting factors which court found to be
incongruent with a true license and registration check).
210. Smith, 674 P.2d at 564-65.
211. See id
212. See id at 563-65; see also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing Martinez-
Fuerte).
213. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 86-95, 98-102, 109-22 and accompanying text.
217. See Deskins, 234 Kan. at - 673 P.2d at 1178-85.
218. However, because of its explicit use of the word "temporary" in its holding, see supra note
208, and because of its reliance on the permanent-temporary distinction, the Smith court does
seem to leave open the possibility of a permanent DWI roadblock. In Oklahoma, the most likely
locality for a permanent checkpoint would be at a toll booth. Use of toll booths as DWI check-
points has met with some success in New York City. See Checkpoints to Curb Drunk Drivers.?,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 4, 1983, at 65.
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DWI roadblock. Litigation, in turn, will follow this experimentation,
adding to the already confused state of DWI roadblock jurisprudence.
Eventually, the Supreme Court will hear a DWI roadblock case or
some other case with similar fourth amendment implications, and re-
solve the confusion which has followed in the wake of Prouse and its
controversial dicta. Until that time arrives, however, Oklahoma law
enforcement officials must rely upon the roving patrol stop made with
reasonable suspicion or probable cause as the primary means for en-
forcing the state's drunk driving laws. Under Prouse, roadblocks which
are designed solely for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses and
vehicle registrations will continue to remain permissible. But as Smith
makes evident, Oklahoma law enforcement agencies found misusing
the license and registration checkpoint will meet with strong judicial
disapproval.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nowhere, perhaps, is the collision between the individual's right to
personal integrity and the interests of the modern state more soundly
felt than in the process of ascertaining the reasonableness of a search
and seizure. In this Note, it is contended that the fragments of one such
fourth amendment collision, the Prouse dicta, were never intended to
serve as judicial approval of the DWI roadblock. Nevertheless, some
state courts faced with ascertaining the constitutionality of the DWI
roadblock have assumed the opposite, effectively replacing the need for
some individualized suspicion prior to an investigative stop with an
elaborate set of operational criteria designed to minimize officer discre-
tion and motorist intrusion. But in making this quantum leap, these
same courts have generally overlooked the essence of determining the
reasonableness of a fourth amendment seizure: balancing the exten-
siveness of the intrusion upon the individual against the degree to
which the intrusion furthers the state interest. This Note completes
that step by evaluating empirical evidence of the DWI roadblock's ef-
fectiveness, and concludes that the DWI roadblock is a minimally ef-
fective enforcement device. When coupled with additional evidence
suggesting that less constitutionally restrictive roving DWI patrol stops
based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause are viable alternatives
to the DWI roadblock, it is believed that the DWI roadblock imposes
an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment.
The Smith court arrives at a similar outcome by denouncing the
[Vol. 20:286
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use of the temporary DWI roadblock in Oklahoma. Although Smith
lacks a fully developed fourth amendment analysis and a detailed dis-
cussion of recent fourth amendment developments, such technical
shortcomings in no way detract from the thrust of that decision: the
subjective intrusion imposed upon motorists stopped at a temporary
DWI roadblock is intolerable. Accordingly, law enforcement agencies
in Oklahoma must continue to rely upon more traditional roving type
patrols, acting upon some quantum of individualized suspicion, in
combating the drunk driver.
Gordon D. Quin
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